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There exists a broad inclination among those who theorize about mental representation to 
assume that the meanings of linguistic units, like words, are going to be identical to, and 
work exactly like, mental representations, such as concepts.  This has the effect of many 
theorists applying facts that seem to have been discovered about the meanings of 
linguistic units to mental representations.  This is especially so for causal theories of 
content, which will be the primary exemplars here.  It is the contention of this essay that 
this approach is mistaken.  The influence of thinking about language and mental 
representation in this way has resulted in the adoption of certain positions by a broad 
swathe of theorists to the effect that the content of a concept is identical to the property in 
the world that the concept represents, and that because of this a concept only applies to an 
object in the world or it does not.  The consequences of such commitments are what 
appear to be insoluble problems that arise when trying to account for, or explain, 
misrepresentation in cognitive systems.  This essay presents the position that in order to 
actually account for misrepresentation, conceptual content must be understood as being 
very much like measurements, in that the application of a content to an object in the 
world is akin to measuring said object, and that conceptual content ought be understood 
as being graded in the same way that measurements are.  On this view, then, concepts are 
the kinds of things that can be applied more, or less, accurately to particular objects in the 
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Chapter One: 
Mental Representation and Language 
1.1 Introduction 
 Concepts are mental representations.  Since they are representations, they have 
representational content.  Representational content needs to be explained.  This essay is 
concerned with the explanation of representational content, and is also intended to be a 
part of a much larger body of discussion concerned with the naturalization of the content 
of mental representations.  Naturalizing anything requires that whatever it is that is being 
naturalized be ultimately analyzed, or explained, in terms consistent with the vocabulary 
of the natural sciences. The naturalization of mental representation, or content, is the 
project of formulating what the relationship is between a mental state and something else, 
such that the mental state represents the other thing, i.e. what makes it the case that a 
mental state has a particular representational content.  The fact that this is a naturalistic 
project means that our explanation of mental representation cannot itself rely upon 
references to representation, or occult forces, to explain how it is that a mental state has 
the content that it does.  The first of these options would leave us with a circular account, 
which is a problem, and the second would result in a supernatural account, rather than 
one that is naturalistic, which is also a problem.  Further, we postulate mental 
representations in order to explain the cognitive mechanisms that in turn explain the wide 
range of behaviour that complex neurological/cognitive systems exhibit on a regular 
basis.1 2 
                                                
1 See Fodor 1987, 1998; Dretske 1981, 1988; Cummins 1996 for various formulations of this 
condition. 
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 The contents of concepts are, most generally, understood as being 
categories/classifications, or properties or predicates that can be applied, or attributed, to 
existent and non-existent entities (Eliasmith 2005; Murphy 2002; Fodor 1998; Dretske 
1981).  The application of a concept is, basically, the application, or attribution, of a 
property to an entity, or understood in a slightly different way: the placing of an entity 
into a category.  Say, if the concept DOG were tokened in response to some object being 
present in the environment, the property of being a dog, or doghood, is being applied, or 
attributed, to the object.  In other terms: the object in question has been placed in a 
category of ‘dog,’ i.e. has been classified as a dog. 
 The general approach taken in most work on mental representation and 
conceptual content that tends to understand concepts as being such that their meanings 
are the same as the words we use to refer to them.  So, the content of ‘dog’ and DOG are 
the same.  And so concepts can be combined according to a syntax to form propositions 
in the same way that words can be arranged, according to a syntax, to form sentences.  
And so, the meaning of propositions and sentences will be the same, in just the same way 
that the meanings of their respective constituent concepts and words have the same 
meaning.   
 This tendency to understand conceptual content as being identical to that of the 
content of words results in the application of whatever semantic facts that are discovered 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Names of concepts will appear in all capital letters, like DOG is the name of the concept that 
picks out dogs.  The meanings, or contents, of mental states or words, will appear in italics, so the 
meaning of DOG, being a dog, or doghood, will appear in italics as they just have.  The property 
of being a dog, or doghood, will appear in regular type.  Mentionings and references to tokens of 
sentences will be designated by single inverted commas, e.g. ‘Jesse is sleeping’.  Propositions, the 
contents/meanings of sentences, and complex thoughts, which will be discussed below, will 
appear as meaning in general will, in italics.  So, the proposition that Jesse is sleeping would 
appear as it just has. 
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about words being applied to conceptual content.  I think that this way of approaching the 
content of concepts is a fundamentally flawed one, because it results in some very serious 
problems for accounting for the conceptual content.  
 This beginning-with-the-word way of thinking about conceptual content has 
resulted in a tendency to think of conceptual content as being such that it is identical to 
the property in the world that it represents, and to further understand conceptual content 
as either applying to a particular object, or not (and not both).  I will attempt to illustrate 
that this has likely occurred due to the influence of two widely influential ways of 
thinking about language: Denotational theories of the meanings of words, and 
Conventionalist ways of thinking about the meanings of words.  I will also try to show 
that understanding mental representation as being language-like is also, naturally, 
accompanied by thinking that propositions are like sentences, and that what is taken to be 
the case for the semantics of propositions will also apply to the semantics of concepts.  
And a consequence of this is that concepts are understood as being true of, or false of, 
some thing in the world, which reinforces the notion that conceptual content either 
applies correctly to an object, or it does not.  Establishing the plausibility of the view of 
the situation I have just outlined will be the project of the remainder of this chapter. 
 In the second chapter, I will further attempt to show that understanding 
conceptual content as being such that it is identical to what the concept represents, i.e. the 
property in the world (the referent), and that conceptual content either applies to an 
object, or it does not, results in extreme difficulties in explaining misrepresentation in 
cognitive systems.  This is a serious problem, because explaining misrepresentation is 
going to be required of any successful theory of mental representation, and this is because 
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misrepresentation is ubiquitous in representational/cognitive systems, and any 
worthwhile theory of mental representation is going to have to account for the common 
features of representational/cognitive systems.  I will then go on to contend that in order 
to account for misrepresentation, it will be necessary for us to abandon any commitments 
to content identity, and an all-or-nothing, or absolute, understanding of the application of 
concepts to objects in the world.  In the stead of these positions we will have to accept a 
graded notion of content, that the content of a concept can be applied to an object in 
degrees, such that the application of a concept to an object can be more-or-less accurate, 
and we will have to accept that the content of a concept has to be distinct, i.e. non-
identical, to what it is that the concept represents. 
 In Chapter Three I will take up demonstrating what I have just said about 
misrepresentation and graded content is, in fact, the case.  To do this, I will need to show 
just how it is that a graded notion of conceptual, i.e. that conceptual content comes in 
degrees, can explain misrepresentation, where content identity cannot. This graded notion 
of content that I intend to employ will be based upon the notion that mental 
representation has more in common with measurement than with it does with natural 
languages.  This position will be taken because a neurological/cognitive system can 
easily be seen as a sort of measuring device, and measurement provides us with a very 
clear model for understanding how it is that conceptual content can be graded.  This I will 
also argue for.  It is likely obvious to the reader that a graded notion of content is going to 
require that we accept that there is some way in which our concepts of the same thing 
(my DOG, and another person’s DOG) are similar, so that it is the case that we can be 
said to, in some way, have “the same” content.  However, this point does not come free.  
 5 
Because there is a well-known argument that any notion of the similarity of 
representational content is going to necessarily presuppose, and depend upon, a robust 
notion of content identity, and therefore content identity is our only viable option for the 
nature of the relationship between the concepts that belong to distinct cognitive systems 
that are about the same thing; as well as content identity being the only viable option for 
the relationship between a conceptual content and the property it represents.  I will then 
make the case that content similarity is itself basic, or that content similarity is at least as 
basic as content identity.  I intend to do this by showing that content identity brings with 
it some very likely unwanted metaphysical baggage, namely the Platonic Forms (which 
have their own very well known problems), and further demonstrating that it is not as 
obvious as it might initially seem that content similarity is dependent upon a robust 
notion of content identity.  And this is because content identity very likely also requires 
some robust notion of content similarity for its even being reasonably postulated. 
 An aside: I would like to demonstrate this conclusively for all theories of mental 
representation that seem to assume that mental representation is like language, but 
unfortunately this essay does not allow for enough space to do so.  So this essay will take 
as its primary targets causal theories of conceptual content that postulate the identity of a 
concept and what it represents.   
 
1.2 The Focus on Language in the Study of Mental Representation 
 Inquiry into the nature of meaning usually begins, as mentioned in the previous 
section, with language, where “inquiry into the nature of meaning” refers to the study of 
how it is that some things in the world represent, or “stand for,” other things in the world 
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that they are not, i.e. how is it that some things carry, or possess, representational content 
about other things that they, themselves, are not? The word and the sentence, as you are 
no doubt aware, are rather significant elements of human language.  For most of us, 
intuitively, at least, language is our model for meaning.  This should not be surprising 
given its ubiquitous presence in human life.  But as a consequence of this, language is 
what many of us (including many philosophers3) tend to think of when we think of things 
in the world that have, or carry, meaning.  And increasingly, language is being conceived 
of as natural phenomena (Millikan 1984; Chomsky 2006; Fodor 1975, 1998; Devitt and 
Sterelny 1999), if it is not already universally conceived of in this way.  So meaning, 
according to this general view, is to be understood and explained in naturalistic terms, 
where by “naturalistic” is meant “consistent with the natural sciences.”4  Thus, meaning 
is not to be understood as something that is without a physical, and law-like-
generalization governed, nature.  These concerns have resulted in the large and difficult 
project of trying to provide a naturalistic account of the meaning of the elements of 
natural languages. 
 However, despite this tendency of inquiry into the nature of semantics to begin 
with, and focus upon, language, such inquiry almost as often relies upon to the capacity 
of the mind, and its constituent mental states, to represent parts of the world such that 
these mental states will provide us with the meanings of linguistic units.  On such a 
conception of language the meaning of linguistic units is “derived,” or otherwise 
dependent upon the meaning, or representational content (as I will like to refer to it in the 
bulk of this essay), of mental states (Grice 1957/2000; Dretske 1981; Harman 1982; 
                                                
3 See Loar 1981; Evans 1982; Block 1986; Harman 1982; Lycan 1984; Fodor 1998; Fodor 1987; 
Dretske 1981; Fodor and Lepore 1999; Lepore 1997. 
4 This is the case with mental representation, which was mentioned above. 
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Searle 1983; Block 1986; Cummins 1989; Lepore 1997; Fodor 1998; Devitt and Sterelny 
1999)5.   
 This view of linguistic content is a common theme in philosophical work on 
language, meaning, and mind, and likely finds it motivation in the idea that linguistic 
units, like words and sentences, express thoughts, and that it is the primary function of 
language to do this (Devitt and Sterelny 1999).  Language exists primarily for the 
purpose of expressing thought, and, as such, is engaged by human beings in order to 
communicate the content of our thoughts to other human beings (Devitt and Sterelny 
1999; Fodor 1998; Cummins 1989, 1996; Dretske 1981; Grice 1957/2000).  Though, as 
the reader may be aware, language is not engaged by us solely to express our thoughts to 
others.  We often find ourselves making use of language to express our own thoughts, 
ideas, etc. to ourselves. When we think without speaking our thoughts out loud, it seems 
to us as though (feels as though), the phenomenology of such a process is as if, we are 
speaking to ourselves “inside of our heads.” Language and thought feel tightly coupled.  
So, it is, in many ways, obvious to think that we think in a language, that is by employing 
a language, and that even if it is the case that we are capable of thought before acquiring 
a language, it certainly seems plausible that whatever medium we think in “naturally” is 
going to be very much like language, i.e. that language and thought are going to be very 
much alike in structure and content.  A natural end to this line of thinking is the notion 
that language will map on to thought, mental representation, nearly perfectly (if not 
perfectly), and so it further follows that the semantic and syntactic discoveries made with 
                                                
5 For a dissenting voice see Speaks 2006. 
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regard to natural languages will apply de facto to the semantics and syntax of thought.  
And vice versa.6  
 Further, this equating of the semantic facts of natural languages and those of 
mental representation seems to be the general line of thinking that guides philosophical 
work concentrating upon the semantic content of elements of natural languages and the 
semantic content of mental representation upon which the content of language is identical 
to.  It is the contention of this essay, that such an approach is fundamentally misguided.  
It is not obvious, upon further reflection, that the meanings of the components of natural 
languages, particularly that of words, and that of mental representations, particularly 
concepts, will be identical, even if it is the case that linguistic meaning is dependent upon 
mental meaning (which I am inclined to believe). So, our mental states are not words and 
sentences.  And this paper, to repeat a bit, is concerned with arguing that mental 
representations are not linguistic in nature, and that understanding mental representation 
as being language like is a mistake.  This essay holds this point contrary to the point of 
view of, for example, Fodor (1998), where it is held that, mental representation is going 
to be a lot like language, for “how could language express thought if that were not the 
case?” (25).7 The consequence of this, as I have hinted above, is that words and sentences 
can be swapped with concepts and propositions with regard to their representational 
content, because the meaning of the word is the meaning of the concept, and the meaning 
                                                
6 See for examples of philosophers who explicitly hold such a position: Fodor 1975, 1987, 1998; 
Field 1978; Sterelny 1991; Davidson 2001(a), 2001(b), 2001(c). See also discussion in Dennett 
1987. 
7 See also Fodor 1987 pages 135-154 on “Why There Still has to be a Language of Thought, as 
well as Fodor and Lepore 1999 page 383 for the equation of a theory of meaning for mental 
representations with the theory of meaning that will hold for language.  See also Harman 1982 
and Block 1986 for attempts to provide the semantics for mental states and linguistic entities in 
one fell swoop. 
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of the sentence is the meaning of the proposition.  The word and the sentence each get 




 Though this essay’s primary focus is upon the nature of concepts, there is an issue 
having to do with the nature of propositional content, which came up briefly in the 
previous section, that must be dealt with before we can move on to a detailed discussion 
of the nature of conceptual content.  Particularly, we must first address arguments for the 
non-gradability of propositional content, that propositions either have a particular 
content, or they do not, and that because propositions cannot have graded content, no 
mental representation can possess gradable content, and so concepts can not have 
gradable/graded content, because they are mental representations.  However, I will argue 
that it is quite likely the case that propositional content can be graded, and that even if it 
is the case that propositional content is not graded, and, in principle, cannot be, this does 
not obviously, or necessarily, lead to the conclusion that concepts cannot possess graded 
content, because it is possible for semantic facts that apply to sentences/propositions that 
do not apply to words/concepts. 
 In order to take up the task I have just set out in a serious and rigorous manner, it 
will be required that we get clearer on what propositions are understood to be, because 
there is no consensus view of propositions (Dennett 1987, 120).  I wish to make clear 
which view of propositions I will be working with for the purposes of this essay, and 
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why, as well as how the theory of propositions of choice is relevant to the central topic of 
this paper: conceptual content. 
 
1.4 What are Propositions? 
 Propositions and their contents tend to play a large role in theories of mind with 
regard to being the contents of propositional attitude states.  Propositional attitude states 
are those like Beliefs, Desires, etc., which are understood as “attitudes” taken toward 
propositions.  The theory of the mind that qualifies over such states, as most readers 
already likely know, is most often identified by the names “Propositional Attitude 
Psychology,” or “Folk Psychology.”  So, when one has a belief8, one has the belief that 
such and such is the case, (Example: the belief that it is raining) where the proposition is 
the construct that follows the “that” in the belief attribution sentence.   The sentence 
structure following the ‘that’ is the expression of the proposition in a particular language, 
and what is being attributed to the belief state of the mind in question is the content of the 
proposition (which is what the proposition is).  The proposition is its content.  There is 
nothing to the proposition other than its content.  Since propositions are the contents of 
thoughts, and the contents of thoughts can be expressed by sentences, a 
proposition/thought is quite naturally understood as also being the meaning, or content, of 
a sentence.9  However, I would like to stress that it is usually held by those concerned 
with propositions, that propositions are distinct from the sentences of a natural language 
that express them.  The rationale for this position is that different sentences uttered by 
different people at the same time, or at different times, still express the same proposition, 
                                                
8 I will take beliefs as my standard example of propositional attitude psychology state for the 
purposes simplifying exposition in this essay. 
9 This was mentioned above. 
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e.g. if I say, “It is raining,” and you say, “It is raining,” in the same context (time, place, 
etc.) both of our sentences express the same proposition, that it is raining.  A further 
consideration in favour of the distinction between propositions and the sentences that are 
said to express them is that it seems to be the case that different sentences in different 
languages can still express the same proposition, and so express the same thought 
(because the proposition is the content of the thought).  For example, “It is raining,” and 
“Il Pluit” express the same proposition and thought 
 With this general picture in mind we can now briefly list and describe the three 
dominant views in the literature with regard to the nature of propositions.  One is the idea 
that propositions are sets of possible worlds.  “Two sentences express the same 
proposition just in case they are true in exactly the same set of possible worlds” (Dennett 
1987, 121).  So, the content of a proposition is the possibly existing conditions under 
which the proposition would be true, or, in other words: the truth conditions under which 
the proposition would be true (Dennett 1987, 120; Stalnaker 1999, 678).  An important 
fact to note about the possible worlds interpretation of propositional content is that the 
proposition is in no way structured or built out of smaller contentful units (Dennett 1987, 
120; Stalnaker 1999, 678).  Whereas the remaining two most popular theories of 
propositional content do postulate smaller units out of which propositions are 
constructed, though they each postulate very different sorts of structural components.   
 A second theory of propositions postulates that the contents of propositions are 
states of affairs, or the arrangements of, and relations among things in the world, where 
the objects and the relations among them are the components out of which propositions 
are constructed (see Dennett 1987, 120; Stalnaker 1999, 678).  I would like to draw 
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attention to the fact that the components of propositions under this view are not 
themselves representations, but are in fact, the actual parts of the world10, which makes 
this theory quite different from our third option, which proposes that propositions have a 
composite nature. 
 The third theory postulates that propositions are sentential in nature, in that they 
are constructed from smaller semantic units according to a set of rules, or a syntax, that 
governs how it is that the smaller semantic units are to be put together and arranged in 
such a way that the larger sentences have meaning, or representational content, about 
something.  The smaller semantic units out of which propositions are built are most often 
postulated to be concepts (Dennett 1987, 120; Stalnaker 1999, 678).  So, it may be 
obvious at this point that this is most likely going to be the understanding of propositions 
that we will be considering here, given that they postulate a need for concepts, which are 
the focus of this essay. 
 There are more reasons than mere expedience, however. A further reason for why 
we will be focusing upon the “sentential” interpretation of propositions, as the content of 
thoughts (propositional attitude states) like beliefs, desires, etc. is because of arguments 
provided by theorists we will be considering11 to the effect that human thought is 
language-like, because it is systematic and productive to a nearly infinite degree, and is 
so because it is compositional, that is, composed from smaller semantic units.  The 
argument proceeds as follows.  It is generally accepted, because it seems to be fairly 
obviously the case, that any cognitive system that can entertain the thought that Bill loves 
                                                
10 Though, it perhaps ought to be noted that the relations between objects, and the objects in the 
world map onto the arrangements of words in sentences of natural languages, which leads us to 
our next candidate . . . 
11 E.g. Fodor 1987, 1998; Dretske 1981; Sterelny 1991; Fodor and Lepore 1999. 
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Mary can also entertain the thought Mary loves Bill, because each thought contains the 
same semantic parts, namely BILL, the relation LOVES, and MARY, arranged in a 
specific way that either reflects or does not reflect reality—i.e. is true, or false (see Fodor 
1998, 94-100, Sterelny 1991, 177-185).  This interpretation of propositional content, 
aside from creating the possibility that propositions exist only in minds as sentences in 
the head/mind composed of smaller semantic mental states called concepts (Dennett 
1987, 130), and allowing for the possibility that propositions are not abstract objects to 
which minds are somehow related (this relation, of course, needing to be explained), also 
allows for a relatively straightforward explanation of how it is that minds might 
instantiate propositional content.12  And this seems to be the construal of propositions 
chosen by the bulk of the theorists that we will be considering, and especially that of 
Jerry Fodor (1987, 1998), who will be serving as our exemplar of the view that I am 
arguing against, because he is the most explicit with regard to claims regarding thought 
being language-like, and postulating content identity very clearly. 
 With regard to this essay, I would like to remain as neutral as possible regarding 
what the true nature of propositional content really is, primarily, because, I am, in this 
essay, focused upon concepts.  However, the sententialist perspective is the theory of 
propositions on offer that explicitly postulates and requires concepts theory of, and it 
correctly, it seems, postulates compositionality in cognitive systems.  Further, it is the 
                                                
12 It should be mentioned, before we move on, that the compositionality of thought is often 
marshaled in support of the position that language and thought are isomorphic, because language 
is fairly obviously compositional (larger, more complex meaningful units are constructed from 
smaller, simpler semantic units and the meaning of the larger units is dependent upon the 
meanings of smaller units).  See Fodor 1998 pages 25-28; Fodor and Lepore 1999 page 383.  
However, this is beyond the scope of this essay, since it is focused on conceptual content and its 
implications with regard to understanding thought as being non-linguistic.  Compositionality is 
another battle for another day. 
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theory of choice for theorists of mental representation that argue for the following 
positions (which directly concerns the proper way to understand conceptual content) that 
needs to be dealt with here: that because sentences/propositions cannot have graded 
content, neither can their conceptual components.  It is to this issue that we will turn in 
the next section. 
 
1.5 Reasoning from Propositional Content to Conceptual Content 
  There is a great deal of argumentative slippage between the contents of beliefs 
and other attitudes (propositions), and the content of concepts that compose to generate 
propositions.  It is not uncommon to find in the literature on mental representation 
arguments that proceed as though the general semantic facts that one might find holding 
for the contents of beliefs (propositions) will also hold, necessarily, for concepts, and vice 
versa.13  Thus, often, when one finds arguments about beliefs, or more accurately, their 
propositional content, one also finds claims that the conclusions of these arguments apply 
to all mental representation.  I am of the opinion that this argumentative strategy is 
misleading, and will endeavor to convince my reader that this strategy is misleading. 
 In particular I have in mind arguments run along the lines of claiming that the 
propositional content is such that a belief that-P, either is, or is not the belief that-P14, say, 
and as such mental representation as a whole, either are, or are not correctly applied when 
they are applied to a state of affairs (in the case of propositions), or an object (in the case 
of concepts).  Dretske (1981, 57-62) holds that the content of propositions are either 
                                                
13 See Fodor 1975, Fodor 1987, Fodor 1994, Fodor 1998, Dretske 1981, Harman 1981, Block, 
1986, Putnam 1975.  See Cummins 1989 Chapter 1, and Cummins 1996 pages 15-16 for 
observations regarding the ill-foundedness of this symmetry. 
14 That the belief cannot be the belief more-or-less-that-P. 
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possessed, or believed, or entertained, in their entirety, or they are not possessed, etc. at 
all.  And so all of their content is possessed by the mind in possession of the proposition, 
or it is not.  One cannot only possess, or believe, etc. a proposition in part, or more or 
less.15    This position likely finds some of its motivation in thinking about propositions in 
terms of their truth or falsity.  And quite clearly, propositions are entities  
(on an interpretation consistent with classical logic) that are either true or false.  Truth 
and falsity are a binary set of values (that can be represented as '0' for false and '1' for 
true), and in classical logic, believed to be exhaustive16.  So, it is easy to see how other 
semantic qualities of propositions, like the nature of their contents, could be understood 
as being absolutely one, or the other, as well.  In order for a proposition to be true or 
false, it must apply or not apply to the world.  This idea seems to spill over into thinking 
that conceptual contents can be true or false, or truly or falsely applied, in that they either 
apply to a referent, or they do not.  Cummins (1996) attributes to Jerry Fodor the idea that 
a concept ought to be understood as correctly applying to (representing) a referent when 
it can be said of the referent, to which the property is ascribed by the concept, that it is 
true of the referent that it possesses the property ascribed to it by the concept (8).   
Further, Fodor (1987) discusses the application of a concept to a referent as being either 
"veridical" or "unveridical" (101).   Fodor (1998) puts matters the following way, 
“Greycat the cat, but not Dumbo the elephant, falls under the concept CAT.  Which, for 
present purposes, is equivalent to saying that Greycat is in the extension of CAT, that 
‘Greycat is a Cat’ is true, and that ‘is a cat’ is true of Greycat” (24).  This quotation from 
                                                
15 See below for a more detailed discussion of Dretske's point. 
16 I wish to remain neutral with regard to the gradability of truth and falsity, though it would not 
surprise me if truth and falsity were graded sorts of things.  I also wish to remain neutral in this 
paper with regard to what the One True Logic will be. 
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Fodor (1998) illustrates nicely the spilling over of thinking about propositions to thinking 
about concepts.  Dretske (1981) discusses the truth or falsity of mental representation in 
total (195), and Dretske (1981) formulates concept application in terms of being correct, 
or incorrect (225), of either applying or not applying.   
 
1.6 An Argument for the Absolute Content of Propositions 
 The idea that propositional content can be graded may well strike one as counter-
intuitive.  And it is relatively easy to see why this might be so.  We very often express 
propositions to one another by using the same sentences.  For example, we say, “It is 
raining” to each other to convey, what seems to us to be the same idea, because we use 
the same sentence.  Though, it also happens that we also seem to use different sentences 
to convey the same thought, as is frequently thought to be the case with regard to two 
different sentences in two different languages that mean the same thing, that is express 
the same propositional content, like “It is raining” and “Il pluit” both express the 
proposition, thought, that it is raining.  What I would like to suggest, is that we tend to 
believe this, and that it has a great deal of intuitive appeal, because we who use the same 
language use the same sentences to express our beliefs etc.  I am inclined to believe, and 
will argue that this intuition is one that we should be less certain of17.  
 It seems to me that it is this intuition to which Fred Dretske (1981, 57-62) is 
appealing when he makes the claim, in the context of developing an informational 
                                                
17 The idea that we should be less certain that the content of every person’s belief that is 
expressed with the same sentence should not be assumed to have, in fact, identical propositional 
content has been promoted by many who think that language is holistic in nature with regard to 
the meanings of its components, or that mental states are holistic with regard to their meanings. 
See Harman 1982; Davidson 2001(a), 2001(b), 2001(c); Block 1986; See Fodor and Lepore 1992 
for a detailed discussion of holistic theories of content.  Interestingly, holists about meaning tend 
to think that if it holds for language it will hold for the mind, and vice versa. 
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semantic theory, that the content of a belief cannot be transmitted via an informational 
channel (whatever it may be, speech, perception, etc.) only in part.  The information that 
the proposition that-P can only be transmitted completely, for if it is not transmitted 
completely, it is not transmitted at all.  Suppose we were to place the success of the 
transmission of information on a scale of 0 to 1. On this scale, 0 is stands for no-
information being transmitted, and 1 stands for all of the information that can be 
transmitted being transmitted.  So, the information that-P can only either be transmitted 
completely, where all the information contained in the proposition that-P is transmitted (a 
value of 1 on the transmission scale), or the transmission fails when it does not 
communicate all of the information that-P.  So, if the transmission of a proposition does 
not transmit all of the information contained in the proposition, (at a value of 1 on our 
scale), then none of the information contained in the proposition is transmitted (and so we 
get a value of 0 on our scale for the transmission of information in the proposition). Thus, 
the information that-P is not transmitted, and it is not transmitted even a little bit.  The 
transmission of propositional content is an all or nothing affair.  And that’s just the way 
propositions are.  There exists no possibility, on Dretske’s account, of a partial 
transmission of the proposition that-P.  Thus it also follows, one either believes that-P, or 
one does not believe that-P, but one cannot believe more or less that-P, because one 
cannot believe that-P, or possess any of the content of that-P, without possessing all of 





1.7 Further Arguments for the Absolute Content of Propositions 
 Jerry Fodor agrees with Dretske on this point.  And in his (1987), Fodor makes an 
argument for the position that the content of a belief (the proposition that it is an attitude 
toward) is not something that can be graded.  So, Fodor argues that propositional content 
cannot be a more-or-less sort of thing, and also claims that because belief content is not 
gradable no mental representational content is gradable, and so mental representations as 
a whole, and so concepts, do not and cannot have graded content.  Fodor’s argument 
occurs in the context of refuting Holism with regard to representational systems, where 
holism is the idea that the meaning of a representational state in a system is dependent 
upon certain other representations—that certain other representational states are required 
in order to have certain other representational states.  This results in an eventual slide 
down a slippery slope to the position that the meaning of any given representation 
(concept or proposition) is dependent upon every other representational state in the 
system for its meaning.  Fodor calls the representational states that determine the 
meaning of a given representation the determined representation’s “Epistemic Liaisons.”  
While the project of this essay is not directly concerned with Holism, the argument Fodor 
offers against Holism has broader applicability than merely to Holistic theories of 
content. 
 Fodor’s argument against the sensibility of a graded18, “more or less,” notion of 
(mental) representational content proceeds in the following way:  Let us focus upon a 
proposition, and an attitude of which the proposition is the content, that most of us would 
                                                
18 This is how Fodor’s argument can be more generally applied to non-holistic theories of 
content. 
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understand, say the belief that Tibaldi is a better singer than Callas.19  Now, it is fairly 
obvious, according to Fodor, that we can grade epistemic commitment.  You can be 
certain of the truth of a proposition/sentence like Tibaldi is a better singer than Callas to 
a greater, or lesser, degree—anywhere between absolute certainty and total doubt (which 
is usually represented as 1 for the former, and 0 for the latter).  However, it is not 
obvious, according to Fodor, that you can believe more-or-less that Tibaldi is a better 
singer than Callas (let us shorten this to Tibaldi is better than Callas—nothing hinges on 
‘singer,’ or ‘a’ here).  You cannot believe that Tibaldi is better than Callas to a degree 
between 1 and 0, i.e. you either believe that Tibaldi is better than Callas or you do not 
believe some proposition that would fall under the English expression 'Tibaldi is better 
than Callas,' if you have, in fact, any belief about the matter at all.20  So, a graded notion 
of content for, a version of which is offered by Holistic theories of content, will not work, 
because the meaning of the proposition Tibaldi is better than Callas is dependent upon its 
epistemic liaisons, and these epistemic liaisons will be different to varying degrees in 
every human being.   
 This is a problem, because it has the consequence that, if we were to idealize (set 
the value between 0 and 1, or at least, a minimal amount of meaning required to possess 
the meaning of the proposition), with regard to the epistemic liaisons a particular 
proposition has; we have to pick one set of epistemic liaisons—those that a particular 
person has, or a particular set of homogeneous minds have, and Holistic theories of 
                                                
19 Fodor’s example is “Callas was a better singer than Tibaldi” (Fodor 1987, 55), but that I do not 
believe that the order of the names in the example has much bearing upon the argument Fodor 
makes. 
20 This is not meant to be about cases in which one believes that Tibaldi is better than Callas, or 
one believes that it is not the case that Tibaldi is better than Callas (i.e. believes that Tibaldi is 
better than Callas is False), and not both.   
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content provide no principle means with which to do so (Fodor 1987, 55-57).  And this 
would require that propositional content be, at base, identical, and so cannot be holistic 
for the purposes of holding that each person’s beliefs, etc. are not exactly the same (i.e. 
not identical). 
 Further, a more generally motivated notion of graded content will not work either, 
because the move to idealization (the move to pick out the meaning against which the 
instances of more-or-less that P can be “measured”) is itself fraught with difficulties. 
Idealization is understood to be like scientific idealization (frictionless planes, pure 
chemicals, etc.) setting an asymptotal value (or meaning) that the values (meanings) of 
the more-or-less content Holistically determined propositions approach, but never meet.  
So, if we claim that you believe proposition Tibaldi is better than Callas n<1, or believe 
Tibaldi is better than Callas n>0, then we would have to have a determinate idealized 
value, or meaning, for n, some value greater than zero and less than-equal to one.  This 
would mean that we would have to have an account of what it is to believe a proposition 
tout court (whatever value greater than zero and less than-equal to one that we set n to). 
And if we have this, then we have the criterion for whether you believe that Tibaldi is 
better than Callas or you do not believe that Tibaldi is better than Callas.  Thus, there is 
no need for a graded notion of propositional content, because a graded notion would 
presuppose that there already are determinate conditions for believing n, or not believing 
n.  And since well defined conditions would exist for what it is to believe n, the work that 
graded notions of content would be doing would be unnecessary. 
 It ought to be mentioned that some of the motivation for Fodor’s argument against 
content “more-or-less-that P,” is that he is an intentional realist who holds that Intentional 
 21 
Attitude Psychology is mostly true, and if propositional content is not absolute and 
identical among the holders of a particular proposition, then the explanatory and 
predictive power of Propositional Attitude Psychology is not very high.  Because if it 
were the case that propositions were “more or less that P,” then your and my belief that P 
would be different.  Hence generalizations with respect to the role that the proposition 
that-P play in minds with regard to behaviour, etc. would not likely be very successful 
generalizations, admitting of a large number of exceptions, which would, more or less, 
defeat the purpose of making generalizations for the purposes of explaining human 
behaviour at large. 
 
1.8 Why it is Not Obvious that Propositions Have Absolute Content 
 However, I do not think that Fodor’s conclusions regarding the contents of 
propositions follow as obviously as he would like.  One reason for thinking this is that he 
begins with the postulate that there is a more-or-less-that P (where P is some 
proposition), which pretty clearly assumes that there is, or could be, believing that-P tout 
court.  However, believing that P may not exist, since it is possible that the sentences that 
express propositions pick out, or label, a set of mental states or relations between objects, 
where the proposition is just a label for a number of similar, but non-identical mental 
states.  However, pursuing this line of inquiry would lead us into a discussion of matters 
having to do with similarity and identity of content, and arguments, put forward by Fodor 
(1998) (and by Fodor and Lepore 1992, 1999), that any notion of similarity of content 
will depend upon an already presupposed robust notion of content identity.  The issue of 
similarity versus identity will be dealt with in the necessary detail in Chapter 3, and 
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before getting to this issue I would like to focus upon the idea that it is possible that there 
are groupings of relations for which phrases like “better than” are merely labels for and in 
so doing, tease out more about the implications propositions are thought to have for 
concepts and the gradability of content.  So, for the present discussion I will skirt the 
issue of the relationship between similarity and identity of content. 
 It is likely that my reader would agree that 7>4, and also that 5>4, and that these 
two strings of numbers joined by '>' mean different things, namely that seven is greater 
than four and that five is greater than four, respectively. So, suppose I were to think that 
Tibaldi possessed a singing quality value of 7 (if we could easily quantify such things and 
let us suppose for the sake of argument that we can), and you believed that Tibaldi had a 
quality value of 5.  Suppose further that we each believed Callas to have a singing quality 
value of 4. It would be true that that the sentence “Tibaldi is a better singer than Callas” 
applies to both of us, but it seems that despite this, it is not the case that our beliefs have 
identical content, because of the difference in degree of our quality assessments of 
Tibaldi.  My belief that “Tibaldi is a better singer than Callas” differs by a certain degree 
from the content of your belief that “Tibaldi is a better singer than Callas” in much the 
same way that a belief that 7>4, and a belief that 5>4 differ in content with regard to how 
much more the first argument is than the second, which would seem to affect the 
semantic content of “greater than.”  As such, I believe it would be fairly accurate to say 
that we both believe, more-or-less-that “Tibaldi is a better singer than Callas.” 
 To continue to address Fodor’s (1987) argument: it is not obviously the case that 
there exists a proposition with the content that Tibaldi is a better singer than Callas tout 
court, against which we could compare our more-or-less beliefs that “Tibaldi is a better 
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singer than Callas,” unless, of course, we were just willing to stipulate one.  But then we 
would need a good argument for why we are stipulating what amount of better counts as 
the “better than” relation, and this is especially difficult given that real numbers/values 
could be employed, and so there is no least number, or amount, larger than another.  So, 
any person’s valuing of Tibaldi’s ability to sing, or its quality, could be infinitesimally 
smaller better than whatever the quality of whomever Tibaldi is being compared to, like 
real numbers/values.  So, it is difficult to find a reason why my “better than” relation with 
regard to Tibaldi and Callas would be identical to yours. This would imply that there 
exists no particularly good reason to believe that the phrase “better than” is not just a 
generalization over a great many states of evaluative comparison between entities to 
which differing values, and differing differences between the differing values, are 
assigned, across many individuals.  
 Though, there is certainly an existent sentence that can be used to communicate 
most of what I believe, and most of what you believe, but this does not imply that we 
believe the same thing tout court.  It is not obvious that, because we have a phrase that 
each of us can use to express some state of our minds, the two states being expressed 
have to have identical representational content.  All this really implies is that we have 
some rough and ready equivalence of meaning with regard to our propositional mental 
states such that we are capable of getting the gist of whatever it is the sentence is being 
used to communicate.  The sentence ‘Tibaldi is a better singer than Callas,’ is a 
generalization that covers at least two different, but somewhat consistent, sets of 
measurements made by two individual neural/cognitive systems with regard to the same 
two objects (Tibaldi and Callas).   
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 However, there is the possibility of a content identity preserving response that 
runs along the following lines: in these instances where we have different beliefs that can 
be understood as different proposition, e.g. the belief that Tibaldi is a better singer Callas 
to a degree of 3 and your belief that Tibaldi is a better singer than callas to the degree of 
1.  However, this would mean that we have different beliefs.  And though it might be 
possible that at least two people both have an identical belief with regard to the degree to 
which Tibaldi is better than Callas, it is unlikely that this would be widespread.  But 
given a fine enough scale of singing judgment, it is also unlikely that anyone would even 
have the same belief with regard to the degree to which Tibaldi is better.  But, even if 
there were two people, or a few more, of the same belief with regard to degree, there 
would still be an identity of belief content.  And so in order to say that two cognitive 
systems would have the same (i.e. identical) belief. 
 It should be kept in mind, as discussed above, that the chances of this being 
widespread are slim, and it would make the identity theorists victory a little hollow, since 
such a small circle of cognitive systems with identical propositional contents would have 
very limited applicability with regard to their generality with respect to more than a few 
agents, and as such would prove only useful in explaining and predicting the behaviour of 
a very few individuals.  This should give a content identity theorist like Fodor some 
pause, given that one of the primary reasons the identity of propositional attitude content 
is hoped to be identical is to facilitate the plausibility of intentional attitude psychology, 
with regard to explaining and predicting the behaviour of people in general.  So, there 
would be little advantage to holding on to content identity over the gradability of content. 
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1.9 The Analytical Priority of Conceptual Content over Propositional Content 
 So, if it is the case, as I have argued, that propositional content is graded, then we 
cannot argue that concepts cannot have graded content because propositions do not.  This 
is not what I intend.  I intend to merely to make an argument for the plausibility of 
propositional content similarity (gradability) in a manner cautious of the argument for 
content identity, and by doing this block the move from propositional content identity to 
conceptual content identity outright by denying propositional content identity21.  But 
what if I am wrong about the gradability of propositions? In case this is so, further 
arguments to the effect that it is a mistake to argue that if something holds for 
propositional content, then because propositions and concepts are both mental 
representations, what holds for propositions will hold for concepts.  
 One reason not to accept that what will hold for propositional content will hold 
for conceptual content is that it seems to get the order of explanation wrong.  Concepts 
are postulated as those meaningful elements from which the meanings of propositions, 
the contents of beliefs, desires, etc., are derived.  Given the fact that the meaning that 
arises from the composition of concepts/words into propositions/sentences is going to be 
dependent upon the meanings of the terms, and that the meanings of these concepts are 
going to determine, at least in part, the meaning of the whole proposition.  This is just the 
systematicity, productivity, and compositionality, point again, and should not strike 
anyone as too controversial.  So it should be relatively obvious that in order to properly 
understand the nature of propositional content one will have to first determine the nature 
of the content of its content providing components (concepts). 
                                                
21 The more intricate matters regarding the relationship between content identity and content 
similarity will be indirectly addressed until Chapter Three where this matter will be addressed in 
detail. 
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 Further, propositions may enter into significantly different relationships with the 
world than their contentful elements might. The proposition/sentence There is a 
dog/'There is a dog' will generally be regarded as being true or false in a given context.  
And even if we were to suppose that the isomorphism between language and thought 
held, most of us, I do not think, would not be willing to say that the word ‘dog’ is true all 
by itself.  The mere utterance of  ‘dog’ (unless it is shorthand for the sentence ‘There is a 
dog’, or some such, and then it is the sentence that has been shortened that bears the truth 
value) does not make the word true or false, and so the same would follow for the 
concept DOG.  DOG could not be true or false all by itself; a property, in and of itself, is 
not a thing that can be true or false.  But it is fairly obvious that it is the case that we can 
reasonably hold that sentences (of the declarative sort), and propositions, to be true and 
false. 
 Despite this, theorists of mental content tend to understand not only propositions 
as true or false, right or wrong (that is, bivalently, as they are traditionally interpreted, 
intuitionistic and sub-structural logics to the side for the moment) but also individual 
mental representations/concepts as being tokened rightly or wrongly, correctly or 
incorrectly, i.e. bivalently.  Essentially, concepts are viewed as being tokened truly or 
falsely.  This, it seems to me (and was argued above), is a common motivation for 
understanding mental representations as being bivalent on the linguistic isomorphism 
view.  The concept DOG is understood as either applying to an object in the environment, 
or not applying, but this probably is not accurate, because the tokening, or the occurrence, 
of DOG, is not something that can be evaluated as representing the world truly or falsely, 
because it does not, as a matter of fact, represent the world as being any particular way, 
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like a proposition is usually conceived as doing22.  This issue will be addressed in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
 So, what I would like to suggest at a minimum, is that even if propositions and the 
propositional attitudes are not gradable with regard to their content, for reasons governing 
their composition, perhaps, or maybe the way propositions “hook up with” the world, 
(though I doubt that propositions are not graded), it may still be possible for individual 
representations (concepts) to be graded. 
 So, in the next chapter we will turn to more directly addressing the primary 
subject of this essay, namely, the matter of whether or not conceptual content ought to be 
understood as being graded, or gradable, in the context of problems that arise for 
linguistically inspired content identity theories with respect to handling 
misrepresentation.  In doing so we will address further difficulties that arise from the 
assumption that concepts work like words with regard to their semantic properties.  I will 
make the case that concepts cannot be understood as entities that possess contents that are 
identical to their referents, and so cannot be understood as being such that they either 
apply or do not to an entity in the same way that words do. 
                                                
22 See Cummins 1996 for multiple arguments for appropriately understanding representation as 




2.1 Words, Concepts, and The Disjunction Problem 
 The central notion that I am arguing against in this essay is that concepts function 
in the same way that words do (as described in detail in the last chapter), where both a 
word, and a concept, either apply to an object or do not.  Difficulties with such a view 
begin to arise when we consider that the standard of correct application, in the case of 
words, is plausibly determined by the community of language users, whereas in the case 
of concepts, the linguistic community is not obviously available to play this role.  So, 
something else needs to do this work for mental representation.  Take the word ‘dog,’ for 
instance.  ‘Dog’ applies only to dogs when we use the term literally.  We use ‘dog’ to 
refer to dogs, and this referring relation is underwritten by the larger language using 
community that is able to say something like, “all of these things here (dogs) that are like 
this (doggish) in the relevant ways, these things are what we are going to call ‘dogs’ and 
use the word ‘dog’ to refer to them.”  ‘Dog’ refers to dogs by convention, an agreement, 
spoken, or unspoken, among a group of people about what we are going to be referring to 
when we use the word ‘dog’ (literally).  And ‘dog’ names, or refers to, all dogs, in every 
user of the word’s mouth, regardless of whether or not the user of the word can, or would, 
recognize every member of the set of dogs as a dog, and so be able to correctly apply 
‘dog’ to every entity to which the word could be correctly applied.  The extension, or 
referent, of the word is all of the entities a community would classify or group together 
‘under’ the designating term.  This is, in fact, a rather broadly espoused theory of how it 
is that arbitrary symbols like words come to represent the things they represent, i.e. 
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become conventional (Strawson 1964; Lewis 1969; Kripke 1982; Stainton 1996, 183-
194).23  Words can work this way, relatively unproblematically, because there are people 
around us who will tell us when we find ourselves applying an utterance of ‘dog’ to 
something that is not a dog, when we make an error of attribution, or a labeling error.2425 
 In these instances, the term ‘dog’ is either applied correctly,26 or it is not, because 
there is a you-independent standard upheld by the community of language users, in which 
one has found oneself long enough to learn a particular language, that determines whether 
or not you are using the correct word.  The reference of the word is established 
independently of you. This, however, does not conflict with the notion that the meaning 
of linguistic terms are dependent upon the mental representations of language users, since 
it seems that there can not be conventions without minds generating, and following the 
conventions (Fodor 1998, 149).  However, the details of this dependency are not exactly 
clear; it is not clear how complex and mediated the relationship between ‘dog’ and DOG 
is.   When one learns the meaning of a word, it is likely a mapping of the word, ‘dog’ say, 
onto the mental representation DOG, or some such thing, that in some way represents 
dogs (or the properties of dogs) in the mind independently of the word ‘dog’.  It seems 
                                                
23 See Russell 1905/2005 for a rather famous formulation of the view that the meaning of the 
word is its reference (the denotational view, see Stainton 1996).  I am suggesting here that the 
denotational theory exemplified by Russell, and the Convention view, are two ways of thinking 
about language that are intuitively compatible, and seem to both influence thinking about mental 
representation as being language-like. 
24 This is not meant to be the way that theorists in general understand linguistic meaning.  It is 
merely meant to draw out some ways of thinking about language that have had a rather large 
impact upon theories of mental representation.  Though, see Putnam 1975 page 247 for an 
explicit formulation of this combination of views. 
25 See Fodor 1987 page 73 for the influence of this theory of linguistic meaning upon his account 
of mental content. 
26 Here we might understand the word is being understood as denoting a particular property, or 
set, and this denotation is possibly determined by the community of language users.  Where 
“denotes” is the technical term in such theories for ‘refer to’, or ‘pick out’.  See Stainton 1996. 
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somewhat natural to think that when one applies ‘dog’ to dogs, when dogs cause DOGS, 
that you are then correctly applying the word (more or less).  However, it is possible that 
one could apply the word correctly even if one’s DOG did not get tokened, but one 
uttered ‘dog’ in the presence of a dog, like when one is/were learning the word and 
do/did not yet know the meaning of the word.  So, it would seem, at least, on the face of 
it, that ‘dog’ and DOG are dissociable. 
 Notice that the meaning, or, at least, the determinant of the correct use, of the 
word in the linguistic case seems to be the set of all things to which the community 
applies the word literally, or, at least, is the property that determines the set.  This “direct 
reference” or “denotational theory” carries over into many theories of mental meaning, as 
we will see below (see Fodor 1987, 73).  An error in language is the misapplication of a 
word to something it does not represent, or apply to when you are trying to apply it 
correctly.  And since the community maintains the criterion of rightness of the 
application of the word and they are able to correct/punish you when you get it wrong.  
This is a common experience of nearly every child, I imagine.  
 There is a comparable, and quite nearly parallel case of application error that is 
discussed in the mental representation literature from which the linguistic case above is 
modeled). It is often called misrepresentation, or even just “error.”  It is very much like 
the word application case above, but does not necessarily, or even likely, involve words.  
However, it does maintain, as the linguistic example does, the view that one either 
correctly applies a property, or category, to an object, or does not.  Here is how it works. 
 In a case of error (with respect to mental representation now), there are whatever 
conditions, or sets of relations, that instantiate or underwrite, depending upon one’s 
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theory, the ‘representation relation’ between states of one’s brain/mind (representational 
states) and things in the world that one is capable of representing.  One finds oneself in a 
situation in which one’s content underwriting conditions are cheated in some way so that 
one ends up representing some thing as some other thing.  Perhaps an illustrative 
example: suppose I find myself in a situation of low light, and compromised audio 
fidelity—whatever mechanisms I have that play a role in instantiating the content, or 
meaning, of my mental states—and I detect, or spot, some four legged creature moving 
about in the distance, and it causes/results in the tokening of my mental representation of 
a DOG.  But there is a problem: what I saw was not a dog, it was a large cat with a 
doggish body structure (or something) that was not, and is not, a dog.  And so DOG is 
misapplied to the cat, because DOG does not correctly apply to the cat because cats are 
not dogs, and DOGs are ‘supposed to’ represent (are about) dogs not cats.  Thus, in virtue 
of tokening my DOG representation, instead of my CAT representation in response to the 
detection/seeing of a cat, I have misrepresented the cat as a dog. 
 No doubt, this happens quite often to creatures that represent the world around 
them.  And because misrepresentation is a regular feature of representation, in order to 
generate a satisfactory account of mental representation one must, when specifying the 
content instantiating relationships between mental states and things in the world 
(whatever those instantiating conditions are), do so in such a way that the DOG 
representation means dog.  So, one’s content instantiating conditions need to be set up in 
such a way that there are things that are not dogs, e.g. cats, that cause DOG under these 
instantiating conditions, are excluded in a principled way from the content of DOG.  
Further, such an account must also not only exclude cats contributing to the content of 
 32 
DOG, but they must also explain how it is that cats can cause DOGs without cats being 
part of the content of DOG, which they should not be.  If cats, etc. cannot be excluded 
from the content of DOG in a principled way, then what we end up with for the meaning 
of DOG is not dog as it should be, but dog or cat or whatever else happens to cause the 
tokening of DOG.  This problem is known as the “disjunction problem” (after Fodor 
1987), because it is a problem of a disjoint content existing where there should not be 
such a thing, and has the consequence of making it possible that nearly every concept has 
as its content nearly everything, because nearly everything could go in the disjunction 
under these circumstances.   This is an especially large problem for the views we are 
considering, because what causes the representation in the specified conditions of content 
instantiation is the content of the representation27, and so anything that triggers the 
representation/mental state must be a constituent/part of the content of that state (as 
would be the case in a disjunction). 
 So, the content instantiating relations must be set up in such a way that 
misrepresentation is explicable in a way that does not allow for the sorts of disjunctions 
just discussed to be the content of the representation, unless they ought to be.  Most 
theories of mental representation are structured in such a way so that occurrences of 
things in the environment cause tokenings of their corresponding representation, as 
mentioned above, is a major concern when attempting to construct, or properly describe, 
the relations that instantiate meaning (Fodor 1987, 1998; Dretske 1981; Millikan 1989; 
Cummins 1996; Ryder 2004; Eliasmith 2005).  
                                                
27 This is like the linguistic case in which the word labels or denotes a property, or class, which is 
the content of the word. 
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 To build upon the immediately preceding: It seems to me, and I will attempt to 
demonstrate in what follows, that a good deal of the difficulty in dealing with the 
disjunction problem for a number of accounts of mental representation is due to thinking 
that mental representation is like propositions/sentences in the sense that they are either 
true or false; and thinking that mental representations work like words in the 
conventional/direct reference case are tokened or applied, correctly or incorrectly (when 
used literally) as described above.  Recall, though, that content is of the world is taken to 
be the set of objects to which we agree the word refers/represents.  So, in what follows an 
argument to the effect that the practice of identifying the content of a representations with 
what it represents, as is often assumed because of the acceptance of the isomorphism 
between thought and language does not, in fact, even allow for error to occur. Following 
this an argument will be put forth for what is needed to allow for misrepresentation to 
occur, and explain the occurrence, in a cognitive system with regard to its mental 
representations. 
 
2.2 Content Identity and its Difficulties with The Disjunction Problem 
 I have made the point in previous sections that the identification of the content of 
a word with what the word represents is very often accepted by theorists of mental 
representation to apply also to concepts and their contents.  Theories like these tend to 
postulate some law-like, or “nomic” relation between the thing(s) represented and the 
content of the representation, and this relation not only determines, in some way, the 
content of the representation, but makes it so that what is represented is the content of the 
representation—that is the content of the representation is not distinct from the thing 
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represented.  The content of the representation=the thing represented.   The law-like, or 
nomic, conditions that instantiate the representation relation are some set of natural(istic) 
conditions that are the representation relation.  In the case of Fodor (1994; 1998) and 
Dretske (1981) it is an informational relation between a thing in the world and things in 
the head that instantiates the representation relation.  The informational view is a version 
of the broader collection of theories that postulate some sort of causal relation between 
object and representation that instantiates the content relation, e.g. Fodor (1987), Stampe 
(1979), and Kripke (1980) (if you believe Sterelny (1991, 116-118)).  There exist also 
teleological views like that of Dretske (1988, 1999) and Millikan (1984, 1989), who hold 
that what instantiates the representational relation is biological function of mental states 
of neurobiological systems to represent certain parts of the world determined by natural 
selection in an organisms evolutionary past, that is the mental state has a history such that 
it has adapted to represent a particular type of thing. 
 Cummins (1996) also lumps all of the causal-content identity postulating theories 
into a category he labels “Use Theories” of meaning (see page 53 in particular).  He does 
this, because in all of these theories correct representation is determined be the correct 
use of the representation, that is, the correct application of the representational state to the 
object it represents.   
 To use a representation is to apply it to a target [some thing in the world].  Uses, 
 then, are simply applications.  To specify how a representation is used on a 
 particular occasion is to specify a particular target[. . . .]The fundamental idea is 
 simple: in a case of correct use [of a representation], content = target.  So, if we 
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 know what a representation is applied to, and we know that the use is correct, we 
 know the content (29).   
Basically, all of the theories listed above contend that content is determined by correct 
use, and the content of a representation is identical to that which it represents.  Not every 
theory listed above is clear about these commitments.  However Fodor (1987) and (1998) 
is very clear about his theoretical commitments in these matters.  So, Fodor (1987) and 
(1998) will be employed as the foil(s) here, because he most explicitly demands and 
makes the case for a causal relation between referent and content and the identity of 
content and referent. 
 
2.3 Causal Relations, Content Identity, and Not Solving The Disjunction Problem 
 It seems that causal theories of content that postulate the identity of the content of 
a representation and the representation’s referent have a bit of a problem.  Fodor (1987) 
calls it “an embarrassment”. 
 It seems that, according to [causal theories like this], there can be no such things 
 as misrepresentation.  Suppose, for example, that tokenings of the symbol ‘A’ 
 are nomologically dependent upon instantiations of the property A; viz., upon A’s.  
 Then, according to the theory, the tokens of the symbol denote A’s (since tokens 
 denote their causes) and they represent them as A’s (since symbols express the 
 property whose instantiations cause them to be tokened).  But Symbol tokenings 
 that represent A’s as A’s are ipso facto veridical.  So it seems that the condition 
 for an ‘A’-token meaning A is identical to the condition for such a token being 
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 true.  Hence, then, how do you get unveridical ‘A’ tokens into the causal picture? 
 (Fodor 1987, 101). 
Attempting to determine how it is that we get “unveridical” ‘A’s result in the disjunction 
problem, and it arises for familiar reasons.  We might say, in order to account for 
misrepresentation, that some B causes an ‘A’, which is fair enough.  But because we are 
working with a causal theory that identifies the content of a representation with what it 
represents, we run into the disjunction problem.  Anything not-A, B for example, that 
tokens ‘A’ will therefore be part of the content of ‘A’, and so misrepresentation does not 
occur.  What has happened is that a representation ‘A’ whose content is actually A or B 
or. . . has simply been tokened by one of its disjuncts, and this is not misrepresentation.  
It is representation.  Thus misrepresentation is prima facie impossible for a causal-
content identity theory. 
 Members of the causal-content identity family of theories of representation have 
attempted to show that misrepresentation can happen, and they have attempted to explain 
how it happens, and to thereby solve the disjunction problem.  However, these ways of 
solving the problem have not yet been successful.  Dretske (1981) proposes that we 
understand the content of a concept to be determined by the correlation that is developed 
between a mental state and a set of a kind of object in the world over the course of a 
period of time.  The correlation is built up from the point of there being little to no 
correlation to the point where the kind of thing and the mental state are reliably 
correlated.  This process will determine the period of time over which this is 
accomplished, and the period of time over which the correlation is built is called the 
“learning period.”  The mental state under discussion will then represent the property 
 37 
with which it has built up a strong correlation with over the course of the learning 
period28.   So, a misrepresentation occurs whenever a kind of thing that was not a member 
of the learning set causes the tokening of the mental state correlated with the members of 
the things that were in the learning set during the learning period.   
 The difficulties with this solution are as follows.  It is not the case that we can 
guarantee that the learning period of a cognitive system with regard to the building up of 
a correlation between a mental state and a property in the world can ever be pure.  It 
would be impossible to ensure that only the property, P, was correlated with the mental 
state that we would want to say represent P, and so anything else that made its way into 
the learning set would be part of the content of the mental state.  And so, the disjunction 
problem returns.  Further, there is no non-arbitrary point at which we can say that a 
learning period has ended, because the correlation of a mental state and a property will be 
continually strengthened throughout the existence of the cognitive system. Thus we 
cannot exclude future instances of non-Ps causing the tokening of the mental state, and 
say that they do not count as part of the learning set (because learning has not ended), and 
so we cannot in a principled way not count the non-P as part of the content of the mental 
state that we want to reserve only for Ps. 
 There has also been offered a teleological solution by Dretske (1998) and 
Millikan (1984, 1989).  According to the teleological solution, the content of the mental 
state of a neurological/cognitive system is the kind of thing that has the function to 
represent some property, P.  And this function of a mental state to represent a particular 
property is an evolutionary adaptation brought about by natural selection.  So, a mental 
                                                
28 See Dretske 1981 pages 222-231 for his development of this idea. 
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state represents what it does, because that mental state has been adapted, over the course 
of evolution, to causally correlate with that property.  So a misrepresentation occurs when 
an entity of a kind that the mental state was not selected to correlate with causes the 
mental state to be tokened, i.e. the entity that tokens the mental state is not of the kind 
that it is the mental state’s evolutionarily determined function to represent.   
 This solution is not itself unproblematic.  The major difficulty with this view 
revolves around the fact that it gets the order of explanation wrong.  A representational 
mental state would be adaptive, selected by natural selection, because of what it means, 
and so would be selected because it would mean what it meant.  A selective advantage 
could only be conveyed by a representational mental state if it already possessed a 
particular content.  It would not then have its meaning because it was selected.  The 
meaning would not be adaptive because it was selected.  Similarly with most cases of 
selection and adaptation, a feature of an organism is not adaptive because it was selected, 
but is selected because it was adaptive.  Eyes and similar structures are not good for 
detecting certain parts of the electromagnetic spectrum because they were selected.  Eyes 
were selected because they were good for detecting certain parts of the electromagnetic 
spectrum.29  Cummins (1996) makes this point as well (46-47, 55-57). 
 It seems then that there are serious problems with the standard causal theories of 
representation that postulate content identity.  What then is a theorist who wants to hold 
on to causality and content identity to do, if he wants to account for misrepresentation 
and solve the disjunction problem? 
 
                                                
29 This is somewhat of a toy example, but it makes the point that we need to make. 
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2.4 Introducing Asymmetric Dependence 
 Jerry Fodor (1987; 1998) has proposed a solution to the disjunction problem and 
it is called the “Asymmetric Dependence” theory.  He proposes that the misrepresentation 
of a cat as a dog (when the cat causes the tokening of DOG) is dependent upon the 
already existing dog-DOG representation instantiating relationship, whereas the dog-
DOG representational relationship does not depend upon the existence of the cat-DOG 
relationship for its existence—the cat-DOG cannot have happened (existed) without the 
dog-DOG relationship already being in place, and so the misrepresentation of the cat as a 
dog, by the cat causing a tokening of DOG, is asymmetrically dependent upon the dog-
DOG nomic relationship.   
 However, this is not a naturalistic solution, which is what we and Fodor are after, 
because the natural(istic) mechanisms by which this asymmetric dependence is enabled 
to occur are never identified.  This solution, according to Fodor, “is purely formal” 
(Fodor 1987, 110), i.e. it restates the problem, and perhaps clarifies what is generally 
going on in cases of misrepresentation—that cat-DOG misrepresentations are dependent 
on dog-DOG representations, and dog-DOG representations are not dependent upon cat-
DOG misrepresentations.  And this seems right, as far as it goes.  But it does not go very 
far, because it is not a naturalistic solution.  
 How, then, ought we to go about solving this problem?  That is, how do we make 





2.5 Readjusting Asymmetric Dependence in Light of Content Similarity 
 The first step, it seems to me, given the arguments made above, has to be a 
relaxing of the condition that the content of concepts are identical to the objects that they 
represent, because, as we have seen, construing mental representation in this way does 
not appear to allow for misrepresentation30.  This is because such theories merely 
subsume the misrepresented item as part of the content of the representation that has been 
inappropriately applied to it.  Let us try to formulate Asymmetric Dependence in a non-
content identical fashion that can be used to guide the inquiry into this problem for the 
remainder of the essay.  This reformulation will, of course, not provide natural(istic) 
mechanisms that explain misrepresentation either.  However, it is designed to enable a re-
conception of what a solution to the disjunction problem needs to look like so that a 
naturalistic solution can be found. 
 Recall the following familiar situation: Suppose I, in a situation of poor lighting, 
like that described above, misrepresented a cat as a dog, and suppose that I identified the 
cat as the dog because the cat caused my DOG to be tokened.  What might I say to 
someone who asks you why I thought the cat was a dog?  Might I not reasonably reply 
that the cat looked like a dog?  Might I also not be able to say in defense of my incorrect 
representation tokening that there was a significant degree of similarity between this 
particular cat, in this light, and most dogs that I have seen, say with regard to size, and 
movement, and even shape—and that this is the reason why I mistook the cat for a dog.   
Similarly, might it not be reasonable to suppose that I am only able to misrepresent a cat 
                                                
30 Or, at least, do not allow for it at al readily. 
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as a dog because cats are structurally, texturally, etc. similar to dogs in many ways, and 
that their corresponding concepts have a fair bit of their content in common, because cats 
are similar to dogs, though, obviously, there are a number of important differences.   
Hence there are different categories and concepts for them.  So when a cat shares more 
with your DOG representation than it normally does, and more with the features 
correlated with DOG than with CAT (under certain lighting conditions), that these factors 
could result in my misrepresenting a cat as a DOG.  In short: the cat has enough points of 
correlation in common with the content of your DOG state to cause its tokening, instead 
of a CAT being tokened. 
 This is consistent with the form of Asymmetric Dependence in the following way.  
I have my dog-DOG relationship, which is likely set up because features that dogs have 
in virtue of being dogs (I suppose) are related in certain ways to my DOG representation.  
So, there is that relation.  Now, the cat-DOG relation will be dependent upon this relation 
in a way that the dog-DOG relation will not be dependent upon the cat-DOG relation.  
Because the cat has (under certain observation conditions), or appears to have, a number 
of features that dogs normally have, and so because the dog-DOG relationship is 
dependent upon/determined by these features, and the particular cat is similar to dogs to 
an abnormally large degree, it can “use” these similarities, if they are sufficient, to cause 
DOG to be tokened.  The cat-DOG relationship is dependent upon the dog-DOG relation, 
because if there were not those features of dogs that are correlated with, and determined 
the content of, DOG, then there would be no way for a cat duplicating those features to 
cause the tokening of DOG.  We will likely have to abandon “features” as we progress 
through this essay, but it serves to provide a similarity metric that is easily intuited. 
 42 
 Thus, for a theory that works as has just been described there has to be some 
similarity of content between CAT and DOG, and this may lead to another version of the 
disjunction problem if we are not careful.  Since this fact of similarity might allow for 
CAT OR DOG representations of cats and dogs if the distinctions between the contents of 
the representations are not carefully drawn.  And since the ‘what they have in common’ 
would be at least part of the content of the DOG representation, cats that token DOG 
would have, to some degree, whatever it is in common with dogs under these observation 
conditions.  But if this is so, why would the dog representation not be best interpreted as 
merely having the what is in common as its content and effectively result in (that is to 
say, reintroduce) a dog or cat disjunction as the content of DOG? To be duly considered, 
certainly, but further discussion of this point will have to wait until Chapter 3. 
 
2.6 Accuracy, Isomorphism, and the Distinction Between Content and Referent 
 Despite the general acceptance31 that the content instantiating conditions of the 
representation relation will involve causation, some theorists are not willing to allow for 
any causal determinants of meaning.  According to Robert Cummins (1996) (who, as 
mentioned above, lumps these theories together as “Use Theories,” because they focus 
upon the use to which the representation is put, as the fact of reality that determines 
content, i.e. what the representation is applied to).   
 According to Cummins (1996), these use theories want to hold on to causation as 
a component off the representation relation, and account for misrepresentation while 
maintaining causation in representation (and so do I).  But Cummins thinks that in order 
                                                
31 Also accepted here. 
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to properly explain misrepresentation there has to be a complete dissociation of 
representational content and the “target” of a representation (the thing being represented, 
or the thing that the representation applies to) and he suggests mental/cognitive 
functionaries called “intenders” that match representational contents up with represented 
objects in certain circumstances and particular occasions.32  For Cummins (1996): 
Targets, then, are determined by the representational function of tokening a 
representation on a particular occasion in a particular context, not by the content 
of the representation tokened.  In our example, the target on the occasion in 
question is P2 [the position of some item in the world] regardless of what 
representation is tokened or what the content of that representation is.  It is 
precisely the independence of targets from contents that makes error possible.  If 
the content of a representation determined its target, or if targets determined 
contents, there could be no mismatch between target and content, hence no error.  
Error lives in the gap between target and content, a gap that exists only if targets 
and contents can vary independently.  It is precisely the failure to allow for these 
two factors that has made misrepresentation the Achilles heel of current theories 
of representation. (7). 
Cummins takes this analysis of error, which holds that in order for error to even be 
possible, there must be a complete dissociation of representational content and the thing 
represented (what the representation is applied to).  Therefore content cannot be identical 
to its referent, i.e. what is being represented.  Since error surely happens, a dissociation 
                                                
32 It is not important for our purposes to go into a great deal of detail about Cummins’ account of 
intenders. 
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like this will be required of a theory of content in order to account for misrepresentation.  
These concerns guide Cummins formulation of a theory of mental representation. 
 Cummins, guided by these considerations pertaining to error, constructs a theory 
of mental representation in which structures in minds/brains/computers represent other 
things in virtue of being isomorphic to these other things.  So, a mental state represents 
something else in virtue of being isomorphic to that something else.  An isomorphism 
between two structures is present when every element and relation between the elements 
of a structure exist in another structure.  So, if Structure One contains elements A1 and 
B1, and there is a relation between them, then there will be present in Structure Two, 
which is isomorphic to Structure One, elements A2 and B2, and a relation between A2 
and B2 that instantiates the same relation that A1 and B1 have in Structure One.  For 
Cummins (1996) a structure represents another structure when it is isomorphic to another 
structure.  As a consequence, two isomorphic structures represent each other, and every 
isomorphism represents itself. 
 Making isomorphism the relationship between two structures that instantiates, or 
underwrites, the representation relation, has the effect that the content of a representation 
is causally independent of what it represents. There is no causal relationship that 
instantiates the representation relation, and so what happens to cause the tokening of a 
representational state has no bearing upon that state’s meaning under any conditions.  
Thus, the content of a representation is not identical to the thing represented, and the 
representation (the structure) can be applied to things other than what it has been used to 
represent in the past, i.e. it can be used in referring to things it has not previously 
represented.  And so representational content is effectively dissociated from what it 
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represents.  So, for Cummins, this is the way he defines how something has meaning 
“intrinsically,” which means that a representation has meaning independent of its use, 
since it is irrelevant to the meaning of the mental state what it is being used by the system 
to represent (93). 
  Isomorphism does not only result in the representational content of mental states 
being independent of the entities they represent, but also introduces a notion of 
representational accuracy, which will be of great importance in chapter 3.  An 
isomorphism can be more or less accurate, and a representation of something might, 
while being more or less accurate, still be able to do the job that the representation has 
been recruited for, despite not being completely isomorphic in some respects.  Take for 
example a map of a city (Cummins is fond of maps).  Maps, according to Cummins, have 
their representational content because they are isomorphic to what they represent, and 
that it does not matter how it is that the map came to be; so long as it is isomorphic to the 
city in question, then it represents the city in question.  The map of the city can be more 
or less accurate, and still be used successfully navigate the city.33  For example, the map 
could lack a number of alleyways, and put too much relative distance between streets, 
and as a result the city blocks might be too long relative to other structures on the map, 
and in these ways be inaccurate with regard to the relations in the actual city.  However, 
this does not change what the map is a representation of, nor whether or not it can be 
used as a guide to get around the city.34   
                                                
33 This implicates the complexities of map users rather than the nature of isomorphism per se.  I 
owe this point to Tim Kenyon. 
34 Cummins claims that because maps are isomorphic, they have intrinsic meaning.  Though, that 
is a debatable claim, given that maps are quite conventional symbol laden. See Dretske 1981.  
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 Notions of accuracy, as Cummins (1996, 26) notes, provide us with a general 
schema for graded notions of representational content, which, it seems (as discussed 
above (in Section 2.5) in terms of similarity), we very well may need in order to explain 
how misrepresentation occurs.  While the notion of accuracy with regard to mental 
representation seems to me to be extremely important, and combines nicely with ideas 
about graded content and the similarity of mental contents mentioned above in the 
discussion of the disjunction problem, detailed discussion of these themes and how they 
might work together will have to be put off until Chapter 3, so that some important points 
can be drawn out about isomorphism with respect to why it is that it will not be adopted 
here.  These reasons for not adopting isomorphism here have to do with the complete 
causal dissociation of representations and what they represent, and how pervasive the “all 
or nothing” understanding of representation is. 
 
2.7 Why Isomorphism Will Not Work, and Why We Should Retain Accuracy 
 As mentioned just above, the context in which accuracy is developed by 
Cummins (1996), (this context being) isomorphism, has its problems.  The most difficult 
issue for Cummins’ account is likely the fact that if an isomorphism between two 
structures is the relation that determines that one object represents another object, then 
nearly every object represents every other object, because a well defined isomorphism 
can exist between almost any two chunks of matter, e.g. between my notebook and the 
atomic structure of a tombstone in Missouri.  The problem then becomes that just about 
everything represents everything else, and it becomes how a representation is used that 
determines what the representation is representing.  So, we need some account of the use 
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of the representation that determines, or picks out, the relevant structural similarities 
between a representation and the represented object, and this, of course, has to be 
specified in some non-intentional language, and this does not look easy for Cummins 
(1996), and he explicitly rejects use. Further, this implies that a particular 
representation/isomorphism could potentially represent any number of things, and so 
Cummins (1996) also needs an account of the matching of a representation to a particular 
target, and, of course, does so without relying on representational content.  
 Since every isomorphism is going to represent any number of things (potentially 
literally everything), then it is going to be what the system uses it for that is going to 
determine what the isomorphic structure represents at a given time, and so it will 
represent, essentially: whatever it can be used to represent, which makes representational 
content arbitrary, and if we want representations to be explanatory, like explain why it is 
that my DOG thoughts apply to dogs, or my MY DAD thoughts apply to my dad, then 
they probably should not be arbitrary, since many of the things that are represented are 
not arbitrary.  Which suggests the problem of specifying what the relevant structural 
relations that are mapped between isomorphisms will be.  If I continually represent 
wolves as a dogs (that is, subsume wolves under DOGs), because of many, many 
structural identities, all of which may be relevant for the purposes of representation, but 
not all of which make it into the “releveant” structural identities, then I may find myself 
in a quite a bit of trouble quite often regardless of how one construes concepts35.   
                                                
35 Cummins (1996) holds that Concepts are knowledge structures rather than individual 
representations.  I hope to skirt such issues here—hence the focus upon “representations” and 
“content” and a down playing of concepts, except where the theorists I am discussing use 
“Concepts” and “Mental Representations” interchangeably. 
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 The thing is that we end up with a problem if we accept Cummins’ isomorphism 
focused account, because representations and the things that they represent become 
almost completely dissociated36, and so in order to have error even happen contents and 
referents have to be independent of each other.  This has its problems, particularly those 
that show up for isomorphism, like the hard questions regarding exactly how it is that the 
one object represents another in any tractable way arise (as we have seen above).  And I 
think that some of these deep problems arise for isomorphism as a consequence of the 
notion of error that Cummins (1996) has in mind; namely that representations either 
apply, or do not, to an object, because, on Cummins’ scheme, representations are either 
useful or not, an so apply to an object or do not.  So, a representation applying more-or-
less to an object in the world is not employed by Cummins (1996) to address 
misrepresentation as it might be.37.   
 So, trying to make representations completely independent of what they represent 
seems to defeat the explanations we are trying to construct when we invoke mental 
representations in the first place.  And though Cummins (1996) brings up the notion of 
accuracy, it does not do the work that it might, because it is employed to answer the 
traditional understanding of misrepresentation/the disjunction problem, which holds very 
tightly to an “all or nothing” conception of the application of representations to what is 
being represented by the representation.  I will address how accuracy might be applied to 
misrepresentation in Chapter 3.  
 Given the difficulties with Cummins (1996) project, we must ask the following 
question:  What better way to determine what the representation represents (non-
                                                
36 Associated only by isomorphism. 
37  This, as we have seen creates problems for theories of representation that postulate content 
identity. 
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arbitrarily) than to have it somewhat determined by what causes it (under certain 
conditions)?  However, we have to, in positing a theory that involves causation be weary 
of falling prey to the identifying of content with its referent.  It seems to me that a notion 
of accuracy applied to representations (“representational accuracy,” perhaps) will assist 
in keeping us between both ditches (arbitrariness and making error impossible).  The task 
of the next chapter will be to provide arguments for how a theory of mental 
representation might go about doing this. 
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Chapter Three: 
Gradability, Measurement, and Misrepresentation 
3.1 Introducing Measurement 
 In the previous chapter, we discussed the notion of accuracy with regard to the 
application of a concept, and so also its content, which is here being understood as a 
property, or category.  So too, in the previous chapter a case was presented for the 
position that it is reasonable to believe that conceptual contents are graded, and that these 
contents are distinct from what the concept represents.  As a consequence concepts ought 
not to be understood as merely applying, or not applying, to a particular object, but rather 
that they should be understood as applying to an object to a certain degree (i.e. graded).  
It is the task of this chapter to argue further for the position that conceptual content is 
graded.  The argument for graded content will occur on two related fronts.  The first front 
of the argument being that conceptual content ought to be understood as being like 
measurements as opposed to being like words, and so providing a way of thinking about 
conceptual content that makes clear its graded nature.  This argument will take the 
following shape: I will make a case for believing that the application of a concept to an 
object is very much like taking a measurement (say the length of, for example) of some 
item in the world, in that applications of concepts are more-or-less accurate assignments 
of properties to objects in the same way that measurements are more-or-less accurate 
assignments of lengths to objects38. 
                                                
38 Obviously, there are measurements of things other than length, like weight, mass, speed, 
velocity, etc.  But for the purposes of simplicity, and clarity, I am choosing length as my model of 
measurement.   
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 The second front pursues justification for the position that is that accepting graded 
content will allow us to solve the disjunction problem, which, as we have seen, content 
identity cannot seem to solve.  However accepting the gradability of conceptual content 
necessitates the acceptance of a robust notion of content similarity.  So an argument for 
the plausibility of a robust notion of content similarity need to be constructed, given that 
there exists a well-known argument for the position that content similarity presupposes a 
robust notion of content identity, and so content identity is the correct theory for 
conceptual content.  The case for the plausibility of content similarity will attempt to 
show that this argument that any notion of content similarity that we come up with will 
necessarily presuppose content identity is not as decisive ass its proponents might like it 
to be.  However, if this cannot be done, it seems that we will have no choice but to accept 
content identity, despite its difficulties.39 
 
3.2 Measurement  
 The focus upon concepts as being like measurements may seem a bit counter-
intuitive at first.  However, if one considers that the nervous systems is the mind, or at 
least the central component of the mind, and that mental representations are formed and 
often tokened by the transduction of energy emanating from other parts of the world that 
is transduced via the exterior of an organism through the nervous system to the brain 
where, due to this stimuli, neural structures are shaped, or activated, that correlate in 
some specific way with these parts of the world, then it should not be difficult to accept, 
to some degree, that mental states measure the world. This is especially so given that the 
                                                
39 Some of which were discussed in the previous chapter. 
 52 
energy that is transferred can be understood as being some pattern and amount of 
energy—frequencies, etc.  And so the brain and nervous system/mind is operating on the 
basis of states that have received and have been augmented in certain ways by the amount 
of energy that was encountered by the nervous system that correlates in relatively specific 
ways with various parts of the world.  Though, it is unlikely that any two such states of 
correlation will be the same, even if it is the same object correlating on two different 
occasions with a single specific mental state via some particular energy transmission.   
Since this is likely to be the case for nervous systems that are different, or, even, simpler 
than those of human beings, it has the promise to, perhaps, provide an account of 
representations that will cover more than one species featuring a complex nervous 
system. 
 Suppose we consider the relatively basic case of gauging, or measuring the length 
of some item in the world (let us call the item, item-x) with a stick, or rod, upon which 
we can mark the length of item-x.  We then measure the length of item-x, and we come to 
a determination of its length upon our measuring rod.  We have a measurement of our 
item’s length.  But is this the length of item-x?  Can we reasonably say that this 
measurement we have taken is identical to the length of the item that we have measured? 
 In a manner of speaking, yes; the measurement of the length of item-x is the 
length of item-x, but there is always some degree of error in a measurement, some degree 
to which the measurement is ‘out’.  If we were to take another measurement of item-x, 
even with the same measuring stick, it is quite likely that we would, this time, mark a 
slightly different length, or with a different measuring stick, mark a length that does not 
match up with our first measurement.  This is similar to (and is indeed modeled upon) a 
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situation that might occur when comparing rods in an attempt to determine their 
congruence, if it exists, as described in Krantz, et al. (1971)40.  The situation runs as 
follows: Suppose we have three rods, R1, R2, and R3.  Suppose further that we compare 
R2 and R1 and determine that they are congruent, i.e. that we cannot detect a difference 
in length between them.  Suppose even further that we find the same to hold between R1 
and R3.  However, when we compare R2 and R3 we find that R3 is longer than R2, i.e. 
that they are not congruent.  So, despite our observation that both R2 and R3 are the 
length of R1, they are observed to not be the same length as each other. The point is that 
measurement taking, rarely, if ever, gets things absolutely right.  Krantz, et al. (1971) on 
the matter: 
Of course, really perfect copies cannot be prepared.  Whenever physical 
differences become sufficiently small, any method for observing them ultimately 
deteriorates.  In some cases, and perhaps in all, observations of two sufficiently 
similar entities are inconsistent when the same comparison is repeated several 
times.  And when inconsistencies can occur, violations of transitivity may arise. 
(3). 
Error cannot be wholly avoided in measurement.  
 This, I would venture to suggest, is very similar to how mental representation 
works.  We can agree that two individuals have concepts with representational content 
regarding a particular thing/object (referent), and that both concepts are related via the 
representation relation, as the rods (R2 and R3) above are related to R1 via the 
measurement relation, but the contents of the two concepts, like the lengths of R2 and R3 
                                                
40 Page 3. 
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are not identical.  The length of R2 and R3 are each similar, close in length, and bear the 
appropriate relation to the rod against which they were each deemed congruent.41 
Similarly with the content of the concepts and the things in the world they represent; the 
content of my concept of x and another's concept of x are both of the same thing, but their 
contents are not each the thing that they are a representation of.  The concepts are both 
related to what they represent, or refer to, in much the same way that a measurement 
provides us with the length of a particular item, but the length of the measurement is 
almost certainly not identical to the length of the item measured, simply given the margin 
of error that comes along with any physical process like that of taking a measurement of 
some item in the world.  Given that cognitive/nervous systems such as ours have been 
cobbled together in a slightly haphazard manner by evolutionary processes, perhaps it is 
not too bold to venture saying that little mistakes in, and differences among, mental 
representations of things in the world abound like those that do in measurement.  
 The question of “how strongly do I intend this analogy to be taken?” may occur to 
the reader at this point.  So, I will address this question now.  The short answer is: quite 
strongly.  This strongly in fact: given that actual amounts of energy cause neural states to 
have specific responses, and structure neurons in quite specific ways, these energy 
affected neural states will carry, quite literally, a mark of how much energy there was of a 
particular kind interacting with a particular sense organ at a particular time.  Imagine it 
being like the way a beach bears the markings of high tide.  Since we accept, most likely, 
that neural states are causally affected by the transfer of energy from the environment via 
the surface of the organism, and that this energy is transduced to the brain’s neural 
                                                
41 This rod against which both measurements are taken is assumed to not have changed in length 
over the course of the two measurements, so that the length of the measured rod is identical 
during each measurement. 
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structures, and that energy and its transfer occurs in amounts (of energy), it is reasonable 
to hold that the most basic representational neural structures will be best understood in 
terms of amounts like m/s, kg, etc.. If this is the case, then more complex representational 
structures of more robust properties, like DOG, will be constructed from these more basic 
units.  Such units would also enable our naturalistic theories of representational content to 
be quite consistent with the units postulated by our other physical theories, like the 
natural sciences42.  The upshot is that the most basic representational states will be 
recordings of amounts (of energy), which would make them, quite literally, 
measurements.  So, more complex representations will be constructed from 
measurements, and as such, these more complex representations will be interpretable as 
conglomerate measurements 
 The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with the detailing of and the 
making a case for the reasonableness of this position, especially with regard to the 
disjunction problem, and will rely upon material presented in Eliasmith (2005). 
 
3.3 The Application of Measurement to The Disjunction Problem 
 There is a measurement focused solution to the disjunction problem 
(misrepresentation) offered by Eliasmith (2005) involving the use of elementary notions 
in measurement theory, emphasizing the idea that it is unhelpful to assume that the 
application of a concept to an entity must be either right, or wrong, absolutely, as content 
identity theorists do.  Because even if we were to accept the absolute rightness or 
wrongness of the application of a concept, such a view may still be a non-starter, since 
                                                
42 See Eliasmith 2005 pages 1041-1042 for a more detailed discussion of the interpretation of 
basic neural representations as m/s, kg, etc. and this being consistent with the natural sciences. 
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such stringent conditions on representation would make matters such that it would not be 
completely clear that we ever successfully represent at all. 
 Why might this be the case? Misrepresentation, is, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, to “say of something that does not have a given property, that it has that 
property; for example, saying that a black dog is brown.  In other words, 
misrepresentation is representing one thing (a black dog) as another (a brown dog)” 
(Eliasmith 2005, 1050)43.  Consider the following case of what might be called 
misrepresentation.  Suppose one is seated in a sparsely furnished and well-lit room, under 
standard conditions of observation, and a black dog is placed before one for a duration of 
three minutes.  At the end of this three-minute interval, the dog is removed from one's 
view.  Following the canine’s removal one is asked a series of friendly, but specific, 
questions: “What color was the dog? Answer: Black.  Dark or light black?  Answer: Dark 
Black. This color (showing a color swatch)? Or this color (another swatch)?” (Eliasmith 
2005, 1050) and so on. 
 It is a virtual certainly that one would eventually answer incorrectly—that is, 
ascribe to the dog a shade of black that it is not, and so, misrepresent the dog with regard 
to its colour, according to the standard notion of misrepresentation, as being a shade of 
black that the dog is not.  While, technically, in the content identity, all or nothing 
interpretation of misrepresentation, this would be a misrepresentation of the dog.  But is 
this the appropriate approach to take with regard to misrepresentation, given that viewing 
this case of the black dog as a misrepresentation would almost certainly mean that 
successful representation would be a very rare phenomenon?   
                                                
43 Notice how pervasive understanding mental representation as being language-like actually is, 
even those theorists, like Eliasmith 2005, who believe that thinking about mental representation 
linguistically is a mistake, still use terminology consistent with it. 
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 Perhaps then we should reconsider what we take to constitute successful cases of 
representation versus cases of misrepresentation.  Eliasmith (2005) asks us to consider 
the following basic notions in measurement theory while in search of a solution to this 
problem. 
Measurements are said to be accurate if they are near the right value.  If I 
measure darkness and get the right answer, I have made an accurate measurement.  
Measurements are said to be precise if they are reproducible.  If I measure the 
darkness of a color swatch over and over again, and get the same answer every 
time, I am making precise measurements of darkness.  If my measurements are 
precise and accurate, they are said to be exact.  Notably, precision is a property of 
a set of measurements, while accuracy is a property of a single measurement.  But 
we can define the accuracy of a set of measurements as the average nearness to 
the right value.  In statistical terms, precision is measured by the variance of a set 
of measurements, while accuracy is the difference between the average 
measurement and the correct answer. (Eliasmith 2005, 1051). 
The “right value” here is the actual length, or amount of whatever it is that is being 
measured in the world.  Notice how this is consistent with our discussion of measurement 
in the previous section having to do with rods R1, R2, and R3, and with the case of 
multiple measurements of the same item with the same resources might result in different 
answers to the question of “How long is item-x?” 
 The interrogation considered above can be interpreted as an uncovering of the 
precision of the subject’s representation of the dog’s colour.  “Although the representer 
may be perfectly accurate [we should probably say “highly”] at one degree of precision 
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(black versus white) the representer may be inaccurate at another (one color swatch 
versus another” (Eliasmith 2005, 1051).  The basic point to take home is that the notion 
that “representations are best characterized as ‘better or worse,’ not as ‘right or wrong’” 
(Eliasmith 2005, 1051), where ‘better’ indicates a high degree of accuracy and ‘worse’ 
indicates a low degree of accuracy.  Further, the more often a representation ascribes a 
highly accurate property to an object (or set of objects) being represented, the better the 
representation will be.  This is because the ascription will not only be accurate on a 
particular occasion, but accurate often, and so will be useful for a broader range of 
cognitive operations than if it were the case that the representation were only accurate 
once. 
 If one would still like to hold on to some absolute criterion of conceptual content 
and applicability, then one could attempt to ‘peg’ a degree of accuracy at which point one 
has correctly, or rightly, represented something, and where a level of accuracy below this 
point would constitute getting it wrong, or misrepresenting the item in question.  
However, it is not clear how this would proceed in a principled manner such that sorites 
arguments like the following could be avoided.  If .5 degree of accuracy (between 0 and 
1), say, were to count as a correct representation and .49999… would be insufficient for 
representing correctly, why would .49999… not be sufficient, since the difference in 
content (and value) between .5 and .49999… is negligible, and so likely cannot constitute 
a significant difference in amount of content, and so on all the way down to the number 
‘above’ Zero.44  So, to follow Eliasmith (2005) a little bit further: 
                                                
44 Holistic theories of content face a similar problem.  See the discussion in Chapter 2 above. 
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Using the term “misrepresentation” to divide representations into two groups 
obscures important subtleties of representation.  We will have a more general 
understanding of misrepresentation (i.e. one that does not depend on choosing 
particular standards and can account for degrees of deviation from any given 
standard), if we accept that representations come in degrees, i.e., that they lie on a 
continuum from good to bad.  (1051.) 
Of course, in the matter of representation and misrepresentation, our standards from 
which representational contents vary by degrees (i.e. are gradable) is going to have to be 
the actual things in the world to which we ascribe properties via the application of a 
concept. 
 Further, it is likely that the standard interpretation of successful representation and 
misrepresentation that a representation applies to an object or it does not45 will be 
insufficient, as it may simply not be possible to get certain parts of our world that we do 
perceive, and represent, absolutely correct, given that there are physical limits to what 
sort of information/data from the environment can be represented by a system at all 
times, or at all.  Lessons learned from psychophysics tell us that there are specific ranges 
in brightness that our retinal cells can encode.  "Outside of those ranges, differences in 
intensity, are indistinguishable; that is a fact about physiology.  If the vehicles cannot 
carry such differences in intensity, then those differences cannot be used by the 
[cognitive] system to react to the environment; consequently, those vehicles cannot carry 
content about those differences” (Eliasmith 2005, 1049).  We cannot represent certain 
things—differences in certain levels of brightness in the preceding example, and very 
                                                
45 These are examples of theorists who hold this view: Fodor 1987; Fodor 1998; Dretske 1981; 
Millikan 1989; Sterelny 1991. 
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likely we cannot completely accurately represent features of our environment.  So, there 
are always going to be limits to the representational accuracy of a cognitive system’s 
representational states, and as such, it ought to prompt us to question the plausibility of 
content identity, and the interpretation of misrepresentation that it forces upon us46, if we 
accept it.  If we accept this view we will very often, if not always, be misrepresenting the 
brightness of our surroundings, rather than representing said brightness to a particular 
degree of accuracy.  This deficiency of our representational machinery makes itself 
apparent also with regard to how much information neurons can encode—there does 
seem to be an upper limit to how much information about a subject neural structures can 
carry, given that “only about three bits of information are transmitted per [neural] spike” 
(Eliasmith 2005, 1051).   
 Robert Cummins (1996) makes much the same point, making it clear that 
incorrect misrepresentation is likely to abound with regard to certain elements of the 
world, because in many instances we do not possess the correct physical equipment to 
represent those things we are misrepresenting.  Cummins calls these sorts of errors, 
“Forced Errors,” because they are in a sense forced, or happen because the nature of what 
is being represented is such that it cannot be captured due to the impossibility of it being 
captured by the system in question.  The system doing the representing simply lacks the 
requisite expressive power to handle certain potential contents (Cummins 1996, 23). 
 The approach to understanding misrepresentation promoted in this section 
provides us with what is very likely a more plausible view of the nature of 
misrepresentation.  This approach to misrepresentation also provides us with a way to 
                                                
46 Discussed above. 
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solving the problems raised by misrepresentation and the disjunction problem when we 
emphasize the idea that concepts have graded content.  It is the project of the next section 
to see how this understanding of misrepresentation and the postulation of graded 
conceptual content solve the difficulties misrepresentation raises.  
 
3.4 Gradability 
 Eliasmith (2005), unradically, understands the content of a concepts as being, 
most basically, and generally, categories (1037), that is, when a concept is applied to an 
object, this procedure places the object in a particular category.  Another way of 
conceptualizing this point is that the application of a concept to some entity is to ascribe a 
property, or set of properties, to the entity; “the meaning of a neural representation is the 
set of properties ascribed to something by that representation” (1039).  This is how I am 
understanding the content of concepts.  This is also the way Fodor (1998) understands 
concepts: “To say that concepts are categories is to say that they apply to things in the 
world; things in the world ‘fall under them’” (24).  So, I am not working on ground 
completely uncommon to the theorists whose views I am arguing against. 
 We all also take the referents of our tokened representational states, under content 
instantiating conditions, to be causes, in that their reflection, or emission, of some form of 
energy interacting with our nervous/cognitive systems results in the tokening of concepts 
with a particular content (almost always a property the referent has).  Though, I think that 
in order to solve the disjunction problem, a graded notion of content needs to be 
maintained, and a graded theory of content necessitates a distinction between content and 
referent, because on a graded view of content, content and referent cannot be identical.  
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Fodor, on the other hand, as we have seen above, maintains that content and referent must 
be identical, and we have seen what sort of difficulties this leads to with regard to 
accounting for misrepresentation. 
 So, here I will briefly adopt the theory of content introduced by Eliasmith (2005) 
in order to show, in some detail, how understanding representational content as being 
graded, i.e. as something that can be more or less accurate than another representation, 
and so distinct from its referent, can plausibly solve the disjunction problem.  As 
mentioned above, this theory will involve causation, but mere causation is not enough to 
account for representation, because if it were, sunburn would represent the sun, which it 
does not.  So, Eliasmith (2005) adds the further element of statistical dependence to flesh 
out the representation relation. 
 The responses of neural populations over all stimulus conditions, and the 
regularities in the response of neural populations to stimuli over all stimulus conditions 
will determine the referent of a concept.  The regularities in the properties/property 
attributed to an object, or set of objects, by the neural structures that are activated, across 
all stimulus conditions.  The information, or data, extracted by the decoder47 that predicts, 
or picks out, a property consistently in the stimulating object(s) over all stimulation 
conditions, is the content of the concept.  But what about the individual referent that the 
concept is applied to?  And what is produced when presented with a particular referent 
under particular stimulus conditions, as it relates to the content of the concept? 
                                                
47 Eliasmith 2005 provides a detailed account of how the representational content of neural 
populations is to be extracted from their firing patterns, which involves decoding the information 
that the neurons encode, in order to determine the content of the content of the neural states.  See 
pages 1040-1043. 
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Well, this way of understanding matters results in two kinds of content:  “Occurrent” 
content and “Conceptual” content.  Occurrent content being the information encoded (and 
decoded) in a neural population with respect to a specific referent (object) at a specific 
time, under specific stimulus conditions, and conceptual content is the determination of 
the property ascribed  (the content) to all objects with a particular property over all 
stimulus conditions.  This results in the following fact about occurrent content.  "The 
occurrent reference of a vehicle is the set of causes that has the highest statistical 
dependence with the neural responses under the stimulus conditions in which it occurs." 
(1048).  This has the consequence that the determination of content (the application of the 
decoder) stays the same for both occurrent and conceptual content, but the determining of 
a referent will vary between occurrent and conceptual content.   
 Since occurrent cases are dealing with specific referents under specific stimulus 
conditions, this indicates a dissociation of content and referent, or the content of a 
representational state/concept and the object property it represents.  And hopefully it is 
clear that the statistical dependence that holds between a neural state and all of its 
stimulus conditions can be quite different from the statistical dependence that holds 
between a neural state and a specific subset of the set of all stimulus conditions.  Thus, 
this theory tells us that differences between statistical dependencies in particular 
instances of particular stimulus conditions indicate a difference in, or uniqueness of, 
referent.  However, we need to keep in mind that the properties ascribed under a 
particular set of stimulus conditions (occurrent content) is still going to “determined by 
property ascriptions under all stimulus conditions (conceptual content)” (1048). 
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 But how does this all come contribute to solving the disjunction problem, and 
accounting for misrepresentation?  And how is it the case that this understanding of 
content is graded? 
 
3.5 How Gradability Solves The Disjunction Problem 
 Recall the above discussions of accuracy and graded content (in Chapter 2 and the 
previous section) in which it is suggested that representations are things that are graded, 
and so are more or less accurate rather than possessing a nature such that a representation 
is either right or wrong, correct or incorrect, will explain the phenomena of 
misrepresentation and solve the disjunction problem by allowing that we can ascribe 
properties to objects, or entities with varying degrees of accuracy without likely ever 
getting any attribution of a representational content to some object in the world 100% 
correct.  How does the theory of conceptual content that we have just examined allow us 
to account for misrepresentation in this way? 
 Let us take once more our previously considered case of misrepresentation—the 
cat that tokens DOG.  In low light, or otherwise non-optimal conditions, something with 
four legs moves in the distance.  My DOG representation is tokened in response to the 
critter that I have perceived.  However, it is a cat, not a dog.  Here we have a case, yet 
again, of my misrepresenting a cat as a dog; my CAT should have been tokened, because 
what I beheld was a cat, but my DOG was tokened instead. I have attributed the property 
of being a dog to the object, rather than the property of being a cat, which would have 
been correct given that what I saw was, in fact, a cat.  So how, on a causal story, do we 
explain how my DOG means dog and not dog or cat in low light or in the fog and so on? 
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 We can employ the notion of statistical dependence to explain misrepresentation, 
and account for the disjunction problem.  This cat has a high statistical dependency, the 
highest statistical dependence in fact, with my DOG under these specific stimulus 
conditions.  This is to say that, this cat, under these particular stimulus conditions, has a 
high statistical dependence with my concept/representational state that under all stimulus 
condition has the highest statistical dependence with dogs, which is my 
concept/representational state DOG. 
 Thus the occurrent content of the representation of the object in my perceptual 
field (the cat) is DOG, while the conceptual content of the representation is DOG as well, 
because under all stimulus conditions it is a neural state that has the highest statistical 
dependence with dogs (and this is what determines content).  The cat, under these 
stimulus conditions, has a higher statistical dependence with my DOG concept than with 
my CAT concept.  However, under all stimulus conditions the cat will have the highest 
statistical dependence with CAT.  So, we have an explanation of misrepresentation: the 
cat, which would under other stimulus conditions (indeed most) have the highest 
statistical dependence with CAT, has, for whatever reasons, a higher statistical 
dependence in this instance with DOG.  DOG has its highest statistical dependence with 
dogs, but on this occasion, has its highest statistical dependence with what happens to be 
a cat.  While the DOG would, under most stimulus conditions, have the highest statistical 
dependence with dogs, it does not in this particular case.  Thus we have a case of 
misrepresentation.  And we have an explanation of misrepresentation.  We have the 
reasons for why the content of the state tokened is DOG, and we have an explanation of 
why, on this occasion, a cat caused the tokening of DOG. 
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 However, we and Eliasmith might ask,  
does this really solve the disjunction problem?  Will it not be the case that the 
highest statistical dependency holds between dog-or-this-cat under all stimulus 
conditions?  In fact, no.  This cat under all stimulus conditions will not have a 
high statistical dependency with my “dog” vehicle; it will have the highest 
dependency with my “cat” vehicle.  It is only under this stimulus condition that it 
has a high statistical dependency with my “dog” vehicle.  In other words, because 
there is another vehicle (the “cat” vehicle) that has a higher dependency with this 
referent under all stimulus conditions, it cannot be this vehicle (the “dog” vehicle) 
that has this cat as its referent.  Note also that this solution is possible because the 
notion of representation/misrepresentation is a graded one. (1051-1052, emphasis 
added.) 
But how is it that content is graded, and how does this enable us to solve the disjunction 
problem? 
 So, how is it that statistical dependence is an instance of graded content?  The 
answer to this question is as follows.  The DOG states of two distinct cognitive systems, 
say my DOG and your DOG, will likely not have the same statistical dependence with 
dogs under all stimulus conditions.  This is because we have different brains, etc. and as 
such our states might vary with regard to how high the statistical dependency of our DOG 
states is with dogs.  Your DOG could have a higher statistical dependence with dogs than 
mine, and so we would have different amounts of statistical dependence with regard to 
our dog-DOG relationships.  However, my DOG and your DOG would still have the 
highest statistical dependence with dogs among our own mental states, and as such will 
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each pick out dogs appropriately, but statistical dependence of our DOGs will differ from 
each other to some degree.  And this plays out in the same way that two measurements of 
the length of the same item (or two rods compared against another rod with regard to 
establishing their congruence) will differ to some degree with regard to their length, 
despite having been taken from, or derived from, the same item, which has the same 
length/value when each measurement is taken.  The dogs will still be dogs, regardless of 
how much difference there is between how high my DOG's statistical dependence is with 
dogs and how high your DOG's statistical dependence is with dogs.  And dogs will still 
be dogs regardless of how high the statistical dependence is between my DOG and dogs 
and how high the statistical dependence of your DOG and dogs. 
 Further, the DOGs of different neural/cognitive systems will have differing 
degrees of statistical dependence with dogs.  Given that each neural/cognitive system is 
distinct, and is "hooked up" to the world in its own way, it is fairly likely that a dog, or a 
set of dogs, will have a higher statistical dependence with one person's (or cognitive 
system's) DOG, than it might with another person's (or cognitive system's) DOG.  Your 
dog-DOG statistical dependence over all stimulus conditions might well be higher than 
mine. However, both of our DOG states would still have the highest statistical 
dependence within our own cognitive systems with dogs.  As a consequence, your 
representation would be "more doggish" than mine; that is, have content that was more 
consistent and better correlated with dogs than mine would be.  Your DOG would likely 
be tokened with a higher degree of accuracy, and with greater precision than mine. Also, 
some dogs are going to have a higher statistical dependence with one's DOG state than 
other dogs will.  So, some dogs will have the property of dogness assigned to them with 
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more accuracy, and greater precision, than other dogs.  This should not be a surprise, 
since the highest statistical dependency over all stimulus conditions between a set of 
objects with a particular property and the mental state that assigns that property to those 
objects is going to be something like an average of the highest statistical dependencies 
between said mental state and said objects over every individual set of stimulus 
conditions.  So, there are going to be entities in the set of objects with a particular 
property (that the highest statistical dependence is determined over), dogs say, that are 
going to have a lower statistical dependency with the mental state, DOG, than other 
objects in the set, other dogs.48 
 Since the statistical dependency of dogs and DOG will vary (depending on the 
dog), even within a single cognitive system, it is going to be the case that dogs, even 
when they have their highest statistical dependency with DOG, are going to have lesser 
degrees, or amounts, of statistical dependence with other concepts, such as CAT, FOX, 
TREE STUMP, etc. (I would venture a guess that dogs will have some degree of 
statistical dependence with, at least, everything that a cognitive system could 
misrepresent a dog as).  And it will be the case that dogs (as well as other entities) will 
have varying degrees of statistical dependence with those concepts with which they still 
have some statistical dependence (CAT, MAT, RAT, etc.), but that are not the concept 
with which it has the highest statistical dependence over all stimulus conditions (DOG). 
 Given these considerations, it seems then that all entities and properties that a 
neural/cognitive system is going to be capable of representing are going to have this be a 
                                                
48 However, this member of the set (a dog) with a lower statistical dependence than another 
member of the set (a second dog) is going to still have a statistical dependence with the mental 
state (DOG) that is higher than that possessed any other object (cat, chair, etc.) with a different 
property--the property not assigned by the mental state in question (DOG). 
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fact about them.  Just about every, if not every, concept is going to have some statistical 
dependence with nearly every property in the world that it is capable of representing.  
However, it will be only the highest statistical dependencies between a property 
possessed by an object in the world and the property assigned to this object by a 
particular mental state that will determine the content of said mental state.  This content, 
as mentioned above, will be the property that the mental state assigns to an object (that 
has that property, or something very close to it) when tokened in response to the object 
with that property. 
 This will all even be the case with cats.  So, we can now return to our favoured 
example of a cat being (mis)represented as a dog for the purposes of wrapping up this 
discussion.  In light of what has just been discussed, a cat, under certain stimulus 
conditions (those that would make it more doggish, whatever those would be), could 
quite clearly cause the tokening of a DOG.  And further, given the variation in degrees to 
which statistical dependence can differ with respect to the relation between dog and 
DOG49, and even cat and DOG, it would not be surprising that some cat under certain 
stimulus conditions would have a higher statistical dependence with DOG than with 
CAT.  Under this particular set of stimulus conditions that results in a cat causing DOG, 
there would still be the dog-DOG highest statistical dependence over all stimulus 
conditions relation, but on this occasion50 it could be the case that the cat-DOG statistical 
dependence relation would be higher than the cat-CAT relation.  And this would be 
                                                
49 i.e. That there are degrees of statistical dependence between dogs and DOG, and so that 
statistical dependence is graded, and since statistical dependence determines content, content is 
graded. 
50 Under these stimulus conditions. 
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because the content of concepts is graded, i.e. that conceptual content comes in degrees 
of statistical dependency. 
 Due to the fact that content is graded in this way, we can see how graded content 
allows us to solve the disjunction problem, and even adhere to the framework Fodor 
provides with his theory of Asymmetric Dependence.  The cat-DOG relationship, an 
instance of high statistical dependency between cat and DOG under these specific 
stimulus conditions is going to be dependent upon the dog-DOG relationship, which is a 
high statistical dependence between dogs and DOGs over all stimulus conditions.  And if 
it were not the case that the dog-DOG relationship existed, providing DOG with its 
content in the particular way that it does: via the highest statistical dependence between 
dog and DOG under all stimulus conditions, it would not be possible for cat to token 
DOG in this one instance, because DOG would not exist51. 
 However, all is not as neatly put away as we might like.  A theory of conceptual 
content like this is going to invoke, or rely upon, a notion of content similarity (as this 
account has done, and so is going to face the objection, voiced by Jerry Fodor (1998),52 
that any notion of content similarity is going to presuppose a robust notion of content 
identity, and so a similarity of content theory of meaning like we have above, is a non-
starter.  In the next section (or two) we will discuss both Fodor’s argument, and why it is 
not as effective, or certain, as Fodor would probably like. 
 
                                                
51 Please note the fact that despite this account fitting the formal structure of Fodor’s Asymmetric 
Dependence, it is not the case that Fodor, or any other content identity theorists, can accept this 
solution.  This is because it requires a distinction between content and referent, as well as 
employing a notion of content similarity among concepts of the same thing in different cognitive 
systems, rather than identity. 
52 Also in Fodor and Lepore 1992, 1999. 
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3.6 The Similarity of Content Presupposes The Identity of Content 
 As mentioned above, Jerry Fodor (1998) offers a strongly stated argument for the 
position that any theory of content that proposes that the content among our “shared” 
concepts (my DOG, your DOG, Bill’s DOG. . .) is similar, rather than identical, 
presupposes a robust content identity, and so does not, and indeed cannot, get off the 
ground, and we are left with only one possibility—that of content identity.  Much of the 
motivation regarding Fodor’s arguments for why it is that any robust notion of content 
similarity presupposes a robust notion of content identity has to do with the idea that 
concepts must be public.  Concepts must be things that more than one individual can 
possess at a given time, and that it is the same concept that is shared by every person with 
a given concept, say WATER. So, you and I have the same concept of WATER, and we 
must, because if we did not, then we would not mean the same thing by the word ‘water’, 
since the word ‘water’ gets its content from the concept WATER.  And only one of us 
would be able to have WATER thoughts, as everyone else's WATER thoughts would not 
be WATER thoughts, but something else thoughts.  Fodor labels the notion that 
individuals have their own different, non-identical, concepts of DOG, WATER, etc. 
“Conceptual Relativism,” and he claims, conceptual relativism leads to some very serious 
problems if you want to take intentional generalizations and explanations of behaviour 
seriously.  So, we are not able, and in principle cannot, employ intentional explanations 
of the behaviour of individuals generally.  And so Intentional ascriptions are not ceteris 
paribus laws, and so there is no hope for an intentional psychology (Fodor 1998, 29).53 
                                                
53 This point was discussed in Chapter 1 with regard to propositional content, out of which the 
accounts of most theories we are considering are built. 
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 Similarity of content is invoked in order to allow for people to think about the 
same things, and talk to each other about the same things, but without their concepts that 
are about the same things/properties having to have content that is identical.  This 
preserves, or, at least, its proponents would like it to preserve, the generalizability of 
intentional psychological explanations.  We have the “same concept,” or at least, 
concepts that are similar enough to each other such that they can be generalized over for 
explanatory purposes; the content of my representation of x and your representation of x 
are close enough alike to allow us to be thinking about, and talking about the same thing 
without having the exact same content. 
 Fodor tells us that notions of content similarity are usually not very well 
explicated and tend not to provide much by way of clear criteria for what this similarity 
between our concepts will consist in.  Fodor also tells us that this is so because it is 
extremely difficult, nigh impossible, to develop a theory of content similarity that is not 
dependent upon an assumed notion of content identity.  How, then, might this be so? 
 The basic argument runs as follows.  Those who claim a similarity analysis of my 
concept of x and your concept of x, always provide the analysis in terms of there being a 
mapping between our respective concepts of x, and while my concept of x is different 
from your concept of x in certain ways (this is what motivates the idea that concepts are 
things that are similar to each other, rather than identical), there are many parts, or 
aspects, that will be the same.  And if they are the same, literally the same, i.e. identical, 
then anyone peddling similarity of concepts is required to peddle the identity of concepts 
first.  So, similarity does not, and cannot, do any real work, because it requires identity of 
content, which is the very notion that it was brought in to replace, which is a problem. 
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 For an example of how this argument works in practice let us consider the 
following.  Someone in the business of holistic theories of meaning, who believes that the 
contents of concepts and beliefs are determined by the other concepts and beliefs that one 
needs in order to have the first mentioned concepts and beliefs, because the second set are 
partly, if not wholly constitutive of the first, would say of my concept of George 
Washington, and your concept of George Washington, that they are similar insofar as a 
number of our other concepts and beliefs constitutively related to our respective concepts 
are the same.  For example: you and I both believe that he cut down the Cherry Tree, that 
he was the first president of the United States, and so on, which will require us to share 
concepts like CHERRY, TREE, PRESIDENT, etc.54  Though, of course, there will be 
differences on a similarity account of our similar concepts, otherwise why posit 
similarities?  You may believe that George Washington wore wooden dentures, while I 
may not.  But so long as there are a substantial number of constitutive concepts and 
beliefs that we share, we have for all intents and purposes, similar enough concepts to not 
suffer completely incommensurable minds.  Thus intentional psychological 
generalizability is saved.  However, such an explanation of content similarity 
presupposes a robust notion of concept identity.  Because it is the same (i.e. identical) 
concepts, the same (i.e. identical) beliefs, that constitute our similar concepts and beliefs. 
So, why bother with similarity, and not just accept identity as the basic “sameness” 
among our concepts?   
                                                
54 You will notice that this runs us into similarity all the way down, why would our CHERRY, 
TREE, and PRESIDENT concepts be identical.  Would they not also be similar and not identical 
on such a view, and then we must go through and catalogue the differences and identities in these 
constituent concepts, that are in turn constituted by other concepts and so on to the point where 
our minds are incommensurable.  Suffice it to say that holistic theories of content are not without 
their serious difficulties.  But for the argument being considered in the main text we do not need 
to go into this. 
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 Similar problems also arise for other versions of concept similarity, particularly 
those that focus on features.  On such a theory we might understand the similarity of 
conceptual contents in terms of overlapping features among the sets of features that make 
up each of our DOG (say) concepts.  My DOG concept might contain the feature tail 
(among many others, such as furry, quadrupedal, etc.), as would your concept of DOG, 
but my concept might also contain the feature wet nose, while yours may not.  So, our 
concepts, on such an account would be similar, but not identical.  However, according to 
Fodor the very same problem holism has with regard to similarity rears its head again.  
The tail feature that is a member of the set of features that makes up my DOG and the tail 
feature that is member of the set of features that makes up your DOG will be identical 
(and so will be the case for any common feature our two sets have) in order that they 
overlap and can be called similar (Fodor 1998, 33). 
 The most important thing to draw from this is that the conclusion is always that 
the notion of content similarity necessarily presupposes content identity.  
By identity, Fodor means identity, in the sense that the contents of our DOG 
representations are numerically identical.  Fodor invokes Leibniz’s law to make just this 
point. 
It looks as though a robust notion of content similarity can’t but presuppose a 
correspondingly robust notion of content identity.  Notice that this situation is not 
symmetrical; the notion of content identity doesn’t require a prior notion of 
content similarity.  Leibniz’s Law tells us what it is for the contents of concepts to 
be identical; Leibniz’s Law tells us what it is for anything to be identical.  (Fodor 
1998, 32). 
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Well, Leibniz’s Law, also known as the “Identity of Indiscernibles” and the 
"indiscernibility of identicals," provides the conditions for what it is for an individual to 
be identical to itself.  The law does this by way of a biconditional, which I will split into 
its two conditional components.  The first part, the "Identity of Indiscernibles": if two 
individuals have all of their properties in common, then the two individuals are the same 
individual.  The second part, the "Indiscernibility of Identicals": If two individuals are the 
same individual, then the two individuals will have all of their properties in common.  
Being an individual subject to this biconditional is also known as being “numerically 
identical,” that is being the same individual as oneself.  Thus, identity is a relationship 
between an individual and itself, and only an individual and itself.  And Fodor holds that 
your concept of DOG, and my concept of DOG have identical contents, that the contents 
of our concepts of DOG are one and the same, being the set of all dogs, or the property of 
dogness.  My concept DOG and your concept DOG are tokens, individual instantiations 
of “Literally the same concept type” (Fodor 1998, 28). 
 I ask that the reader keep in mind Fodor's insistence upon content identity, 
because it will be the primary focus of the next section.  In the next section the case will 
be made that insisting upon content identity results in some very serious difficulties for 
any theory of content identity.  Further, it will be argued that it is not so obvious that 
similarity strictly depends on identity in some way such that identity escapes being 





3.7 Arguments in Defense of The Similarity of Content 
 In this section we will examine two related problems that arise for theories of 
content that want to postulate content identity as basic, and that content similarity as 
being dependent upon content identity, where content identity is the idea that the content 
of a concept is identical to its referent, and it is therefore the case that concepts of the 
same things in various people have identical content—the referent.  These problems with 
content identity regard its dragging into matters Platonic Forms will be discussed first—
followed by an argument questioning the correctness of the assumption that similarity 
presupposes, and depends upon identity.  
 
3.7.1 The Identity of Content brings with it The Platonic Forms  
 Fodor (1998) really means identity, that is, numerical identity.  He even invokes 
Leibniz’ Law to make the point.  This means that peoples’ concepts are literally the 
same, not the same in the manner of ‘you have the same car I do.’  This means that when 
we are discussing a property that a particular concept represents, say dogness, in the case 
of DOG, that the content of DOG is dogness.  So, the content of every correct instance of 
a tokening of DOG is an identification of the property of dogness in the object that causes 
the tokening, otherwise known as the referent.  This means that the referent possesses the 
property of dogness.  This, then, has the consequence that every dog possesses the 
identical property of dogness, and that this property is the numerically identical property 
of dogness.  The reader may be able to see where this argument is heading.  It is heading 
in the direction of Platonic Forms.  Here is why:  If every dog is in possession of the 
same property of dogness, as this must be the case in order for all of our DOG concepts 
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to have identical content, then each dog has the numerically identical property of 
dogness.  This then means that there is some property, dogness, in which every item that 
is a dog shares, or “participates,” and this is, in broad outline, the Platonic theory of 
Forms.  As the reader is no doubt aware, the Platonic theory of forms is not without its 
difficulties, particularly with regard to explicating how particulars (tokens) share in, or 
participate in, universals (types). 
 Further, one cannot remove oneself from the grip of this problem by claiming that 
what we have is an instance of individual tokens of dogness (individual entities that 
possess dogness) of the numerically identical (and one and only) property type, dogness.  
This will not work, because the theory of Forms is an attempted solution to the problem 
of exactly how it is that we have types and tokens, or universals and particulars, in the 
first place.  Generally speaking, invoking the phenomena that the theory you wish to 
reject is attempting to explain as a way to avoid the problems that result from the rest of 
your theoretical endeavors is not an effective strategy.  Recall that Fodor (1998, 28) 
quoted above invokes the type/token distinction, but he does not hazard a guess as to the 
nature of the type/token relationship.  It would not surprise me if this were why. 
 It should be noted that explanations of issue of the relationship between the 
universal and the particular have been offered in a more Aristotelian vein.  On such a 
view universals, or types, or general terms, are abstractions created by the minds of 
people.   These abstractions take the form of groups generated from a number of 
particulars that have seemed to the mind appropriate to group together, because some 
aspect of each of their natures has been judged to be common enough to be a suitable 
way to categorize the individuals as belonging to this mind-created grouping.  Though, 
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this would seem to proceed on the basis of the similarities among the various features of 
the individuals grouped together, and could not be accepted by an identity theorist.  This 
approach, unfortunately, is not without its problems.  The argument that I am attempting 
to undermine reemerges.  What makes it the case that these judged-to-exist-similarities 
are not dependent upon real identities of features between the individuals? 
 
3.7.2 The Identity of Content Presupposes The Similarity of Content 
 Does it not seem then that similarity is always going to be dependent upon some 
notion of identity that underwrites the similarity relation?  Are we not always faced with 
the same difficulty?  As Fodor puts it, “It looks as though a robust notion of content 
similarity can’t but presuppose a correspondingly robust notion of content identity.  
Notice that this situation is not symmetrical; the notion of content identity doesn’t require 
a prior notion of content similarity.” (1998, 32). 
 This problematic, I believe, needs to be turned around in order to be properly 
dealt with.  What is it that is possibly identical between two distinct, but similar entities, 
such that what is identical could underwrite similarity?  If we are to understand identity 
as numerical identity (as Fodor clearly does), then nothing can do the job, because 
numerical identity is a relation between an entity, or element, or whatever, and itself.  As 
soon as one introduces two distinct entities, one gives up numerical identity.  So, what 
sort of identity are we to rely upon for the determination of similarity?  And further, what 
is going to be identical between two entities, or representations, or anything?  No two 
entities are going to have much that will be identical, whatever that is, between them.  
What would be identical?  Relative positions?  Line segments?  Points? Points of colour?  
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If we have to whittle down what is identical between entities, and mental states, to such 
small and fragmented components, then what value could identity have for a theory of 
content?—Even with regard to something like dogness, what is dogness?  What is any 
such property? Some set of further properties that can be identical to the properties of 
other things that are dogs that then constitute doghood?  Do these further properties 
continue to break down as well?  Again, we are left, it would seem, with small fragments 
of identical elements, and it is unclear how this would allow for the construction of a 
robust, or useful, theory of content.55  
 But how is it that these distinct elements, or entities are identical anyway?  I 
would like to label this problem "the problem of identifying identity relations between 
two entities."  It seems to me that any judgment of identity that is not based upon 
numerical identity, is going to have to be dependent upon some criteria that establishes 
the identity of distinct entities. And the further this seems to go, the more and more it 
begins to seem that any notion of identity between two entities that are not numerically 
identical is going to run aground on the question of: so what makes these distinct entities 
identical?  The answer does not seem to be forthcoming,56 and it looks as though, any 
notion of inter-entity identity is going to depend on something very much like Platonic 
Forms (and we are familiar with those difficulties already).  So, it seems that any 
judgment, or account, of inter entity identity is going to have to rely upon some basic 
                                                
55 A content identity theorist might object by claiming that a property is an abstract entity.  But 
serious difficulties still arise.  How would a neurological/cognitive system have a naturalistic 
relationship with an abstract entity?  If the answer is: via the particular instances of the property 
in particular individuals, then we still need some account of how the abstract property is 
instantiated in each individual that possesses it, and why it would be the case that every particular 
instance of the property is identical to every other individual instance of it.  The problems 
discussed in the previous section return. 
56 See Deutsch 2002 and Noonan 2006. 
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notion of similarity, or at least some judgment of similarity.  For example: suppose that 
we want to say, or believe that item x is identical to item y, with respect to property z, 
because the properties zx and zy, are very much alike, i.e. similar, and we have no 
conditions for identity between zx and zy, because they are two distinct things. The thrust 
of this is that it is not unreasonable to believe that similarity, and identity between 
entities, are interdependent.   
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 It would seem that we have reached an end.  The linguistic approach to the 
representational content of concepts, and the notions of content identity it inspires, run 
into what appear to be, at the moment, near insurmountable difficulties.  This is 
especially so with regard to the matter of misrepresentation, since it makes 
misrepresentation close to impossible to account for.  This is a serious problem for any 
theory of mental representation, because misrepresentation is obviously ubiquitous in 
cognitive systems, and so any theory of mental representation that is going to be 
anywhere near acceptable is going to have to account for misrepresentation.  Further, in 
order to account for misrepresentation, and solve the “disjunction problem” that comes 
along with it, a causal theory of content seems to require a graded notion of content.  And 
this leads, I have argued, to a need to model mental representation on the workings of 
measurement, as opposed to focusing upon the workings of human natural languages, 
which aside from inspiring faulty intuitions with regard to the nature of mental 
representation, like content identity, also tends to result in ignoring the constraints placed 
upon accounts of mental representation by the vehicles of those representations, namely, 
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neural structures.  Further, the notion of graded content that seems to allow us to account 
for misrepresentation, and solves the disjunction problem was dependent upon content 
similarity, as opposed to content identity.  Even further, it has also been argued that a 
notion of content similarity need not presuppose a robust notion of content identity 
asymmetrically, as it seems to be the case that identity with regard to content (as well as 
other things) is dependent upon similarity. Finally, the focus upon language and content 
identity in attempting to account for conceptual content requires Platonic Forms, and so 
seems to drag along with it a great deal of unwanted metaphysical baggage.  Personally, I 
would rather not have to carry it. 
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